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SCIENTER, CAUSATION, AND HARM IN FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION ANALYSIS: THE RIGHT HAND SIDE OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CALCULUS
Wilson Huhn*
But, although the rights of free speech and assembly are fundamental,
they are not in their nature absolute. Their exercise is subject to
restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is required in order to
protect the state from destruction or from serious injury, political,
economic or moral.'
INTRODUCTION
Laws that infringe on freedom of expression, like all prohibitory laws, are
enacted to prevent harm from occurring. The Supreme Court has refused to
confer absolute protection upon freedom of expression, a position that would
render all laws restricting expression unconstitutional.' Instead, to determine the
constitutionality of laws restricting expression, the Court has turned to a balancing
approach, which requires the Court to balance the value of freedom of expression
against the harm to be prevented.3 The more that a law closes off opportunities
* B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; C. Blake McDowell, Jr.,
Professor of Law and Research Fellow, Constitutional Law Center, University of Akron
School of Law. Research for this article was funded by a summer fellowship awarded by the
University of Akron School of Law. I am grateful to Professor Steven J. Heyman for his
many valuable comments and suggestions.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1926) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
2 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) ("The protections afforded by the First
Amendment... are not absolute .... "); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571
(1942) ("[I]t is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and
under all circumstances.") (citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919)).
3 See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 339 (1989)
("Sensible interpretation of the First Amendment requires evaluation of the values of liberty
of speech and of the dangers of particular kinds of communications."). See also WLLAM W.
VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1984) (proposing a general
formulation describing the Court's approach to resolving First Amendment cases). Professor
Van Alstyne states:
The question in each case is whether the circumstances were
sufficiently compelling to justify the degree of infringement resulting
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for the expression of ideas, the more evidence of harm the government must offer
to justify the law.
In a previous article,4 I proposed that the constitutionality of laws affecting
freedom of expression may be determined by reference to a "constitutional calculus"
which is expressed by the following formula:
EXPRESSIVE VALUE (content, character, context, nature, and scope)
COMPARED TO
PROOFOF HARM (scienter, causation, and nature and degree of harm)5
The article suggested that the Supreme Court is developing a new approach in
freedom of expression cases. The standard approach has been based upon the fact
that expression is a function of two variables: (i) the ideas that are expressed and
(ii) the means or modes of expression that are used to communicate those ideas.6
Traditionally, laws that prohibit the expression of particular ideas have been
characterized as "content based," while laws that close off opportunities for
from the law, given the relationship of the speech abridged to the pre-
suppositions of the first amendment, and the relationship of the law to
the responsibilities of the level of government that has presumed to act.
Id. at 48.
But see C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 996
(1997) ("This thesis rejects the popular and intuitively plausible premise that prevention of
harm (with 'harm' meaning pain, injury, or set back of interest) justifies limits on liberty.").
Professor Baker states that "speech covered by the rationale for free speech should never be
regulated because of the harm that it causes." Id. at 979. In place of a balancing approach,
Professor Baker has sought to develop a categorical approach to resolving the constitu-
tionality of laws restricting liberty generally and freedom of speech in particular. For
example, Baker distinguishes between laws that "prohibit" liberty and laws that merely
"allocate" liberty. Id. at 1001. He defines "liberty" narrowly so as to exclude exploitative
behavior such as "price fixing, air or water pollution, maintaining an unsafe workplace,
payment of less than a minimum wage, drunk driving, and selling unsafe products." Id. at
1005. He explains that the permissibility of laws regulating such behavior "hinges on the
relevant liberty not being at stake, or, in a few peculiar situations, being at stake on both
sides of the issue." Id.
In my opinion, a practical problem with the categorical approach to determining the
constitutionality of laws restricting expression is that, in order to explain cases of any
complexity, it is necessary to develop an increasingly complex set of categories. More
importantly, the categories themselves must ultimately be justified. The purpose of this
Article is to identify the underlying elements that determine the outcome in freedom of
expression cases, regardless of the categories that are employed to represent those elements.
' Wilson Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws That Are Both Content-Based
and Content-Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801 (2004)
[hereinafter Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality].
Id. at 809.
6 See id. at 810-13 (discussing Justice Stevens's proposed constitutional calculus).
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expression have been classified as "content neutral," and typically content based
laws have been evaluated under a stricter standard of review than content neutral
laws.7 The central problem with this framework is that in many difficult freedom
of expression cases, the laws in question limit both the ideas being expressed and
the modes of expression, making it impossible to characterize the laws as purely
content based or purely content neutral.' Where a law restricting expression has
both content based and content neutral elements, the expressive value of what has
been lost consists of both the value of the ideas that are being suppressed and the
value of the modes of expression that are being closed off.' The Court increasingly
uses a multi-factor standard (developed by Justice John Paul Stevens) that takes into
consideration the content, character, context, scope, and nature of a regulation on
speech in order to assess the degree or extent of the restriction on speech."0 This
constitutes an estimation of the expressive value of what has been lost, and it is the
left hand side of the "constitutional calculus.""
The purpose of this Article is to describe the right hand side of the constitutional
equation for freedom of expression. 2 Exactly what is it that the government must
prove in order to justify a regulation of speech? I suggest that the government
must prove the existence of three factors: scienter, causation, and harm. As used in
this Article, the term "scienter" means the state of mind that a speaker must have
before he or she may be punished for expressing a certain idea or using a medium
of expression.' Causation is the likelihood that harm will result from the speaker's
actions. The harm itself consists of two separate elements: (i) the nature and (ii) the
degree of the injury that the government is seeking to prevent. In order for a law
regulating expression to be found constitutional, the harm that will be prevented by
enacting the restriction on expression must be greater than the expressive value that
is lost. The greater the expressive value, the more the government must prove in
terms of scienter, causation, and harm.
7 Id. at 804 n.11.
' Id. at 806 ("Many laws regulating expression - perhaps most such laws - are both
content-based and content-neutral.").
9 See id.
See Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality, supra note 4, at 810-13.
See id. at 813.
2 The tendency of the Supreme Court to focus its analysis on "harm" is apparent in the
language of its recent First Amendment opinions. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition, 535 U.S. 234,241-42, 249-50, 255 (2002) (using the word "harm" seven times);
id. at 262, 264-65 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (using the word "harm" three times).
13 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1373 (8th ed. 2004) (defining "scienter" as "[a] degree
of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act
or omission"). I have used the term "scienter" instead of the more neutral term "state of
mind" in order to emphasize the fact that in many freedom of expression cases, the
Constitution requires the government to prove that the speaker possessed a culpable state of
mind.
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The analytical framework for proof of harm arises from the confluence of two
principles that undergird the doctrine of freedom of expression: the "harm principle"
and the "value principle." These two principles are based on competing visions
of the First Amendment. The harm principle promotes individual autonomy, and
the value principle serves social purposes such as promoting democratic structures
and facilitating the search for truth. The interaction between these two principles
implies that the more valuable the expression that is suppressed, the more proof of
harm that is needed to justify the suppression.
This Article consists of the following parts. Part I describes the "harm principle"
and the "value principle" and how the interaction between these principles has
shaped the law of freedom of expression. Part U1 suggests that "proof of harm"
consists of four components: scienter, causation, the nature of the harm, and the
degree of the harm. Each of these components is illustrated with examples from
recent Supreme Court opinions. Part III demonstrates how constitutional doctrine
calibrates proof of harm to the expressive value of speech, using the law of
defamation as an example. The higher the value of the speech, the higher the level
of scienter, causation, and harm that must be proven to sustain the constitutionality
of a law suppressing the speech. Part IV suggests that there is an emerging trend in
Supreme Court decisions towards an empirical, fact-based analysis of the harm
resulting from speech. I conclude that to an ever-increasing extent, the constitution-
ality of laws regulating expression under the Court's decisions turns upon a careful
and reasoned analysis of the nature of the harm resulting from speech, the degree of
the harm, the probability that the speech will cause the harm, and in certain cases,
the intent of the speaker to cause the harm.
1. THE HARM PRINCIPLE AND THE VALUE PRINCIPLE
Felix Frankfurter once observed that "there is hardly a question of any real
difficulty before the Court that does not entail more than one so-called principle. '"'4
First Amendment questions are no exception. In difficult cases arising under the
First Amendment, fundamental principles intersect and clash, and our understanding
14 FELiX FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN 43 (1956). H.L.A. Hart agrees with
Frankfurter's assessment:
It is of crucial importance that cases for decision do not arise in a
vacuum but in the course of the operation of a working body of rules,
an operation in which a multiplicity of diverse considerations are
continuously recognized as good reasons for a decision.... Frequently
these considerations conflict, and courts are forced to balance or weigh
them and to determine priorities among them.
H.L.A. Hart, Problems of Philosophy of Law, 6 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 271
(Paul Edwards, ed., 1967).
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of freedom of expression is the result of compromise among these principles.
There are two basic principles that the Supreme Court has invoked in assessing
the constitutionality of laws affecting expression: the "harm principle" and the
"value principle." The harm principle requires that any law that regulates expression
must not do so simply because the ideas being expressed are unpopular, but rather
because the expression will harm others. This principle reflects our respect for
individual autonomy - people are free to think what they want and to say what they
think. 5 For example, this principle explains why laws that forbid burning the
American flag are unconstitutional.
16
The value principle is the concept that speech that serves the search for political,
religious, scientific, or artistic truth receives more protection under the First
Amendment than speech that does not. This principle instantiates the communi-
tarian purposes of the First Amendment, and reflects the idea that freedom of speech
is the engine that drives the search for truth and the foundation upon which our
democracy is built. The intersection of the harm principle and the value principle
establishes the concept that there is a direct correlation between the value of the
speech being regulated and the degree and likelihood of harm that must be proven
before the speech can be suppressed.
Parts A and B below describe the harm principle and the value principle. Part
C describes how the Supreme Court has extended the value principle to create
hierarchies within categories of speech based upon their relative value to society.
Part D discusses the application of the value principle to content neutral aspects of
laws regulating expression. Part E describes how the competing visions of the First
Amendment represented by the harm principle and the value principle have required
the Court to balance the First Amendment rights of the speakers against the First
Amendment rights of the listeners. Part F describes a number of conflicts between
the right to freedom of expression and non-constitutional governmental interests.
A. The Harm Principle
In 1859 John Stuart Mill published his famous treatise On Liberty in which he
articulated the idea that people have the right to do what they want so long as they
"5 See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1925) (Brandeis, J., concurring)
(describing the First Amendment as protecting the "freedom to think as you will and to speak
as you think").
6 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989) (stating that the law may not "prohibit
the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable").
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do not harm others,'7 a concept which is known as the "harm principle."' 8 A number
of legal philosophers agree with Mill that the presence of harm is a necessary
condition to justify government regulation.' 9 In 2003, the Supreme Court adopted
that view, effectively making the harm principle a necessary component of
substantive due process, at least in cases where fundamental rights are involved.
In Lawrence v. Texas,20 in the course of striking down a state statute making
homosexual intercourse a crime, the Court stated that "the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not
'7 See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publ'g Co.
1978) (1859). Mill wrote:
The object of this essay is to assert one very simple principle, as
entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual
in the way of compulsion and control, whether the means used be
physical force in the form of legal penalties or the moral coercion of
public opinion. That principle is that the sole end for which mankind
are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the
liberty of action of any of their number is self-protection. That the
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm
to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do or forbear because it
will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier,
because, in the opinions of others, to do so would be wise or even right.
These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with
him, or persuading him, or entreating him, but not for compelling him
or visiting him with any evil in case he do otherwise. To justify that,
the conduct from which it is desired to deter him must be calculated to
produce evil to someone else. The only part of the conduct of any one
for which he is amenable to society is that which concerns others. In
the part which merely concerns himself, his independence is, of right,
absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign.
Id. at9.
"8 See Matthew D. Adler, Risk, Death and Harm: The Normative Foundations of Risk
Regulation, 87 MINN. L. REv. 1293, 1442 (2003) ("John Stuart Mill famously advanced what
might be termed the 'Harm Principle': Only those actions which cause harm to persons other
than the actor ought to be criminally proscribed and punished.").
'9 Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 114 (1999). Bernard Harcourt observes that "in the writings of John
Stuart Mill, H.L.A. Hart, and Joel Feinberg, the harm principle acted as a necessary but not
sufficient condition for legal enforcement." Accord, Stuart P. Green, Lying, Misleading, and
Falsely Denying: How Moral Concepts Inform the Law of Perjury, Fraud, and False
Statements, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 157, 159 (2001) (stating that proponents of the harm principle
admit that harm is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for criminality).
20 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (striking down a state statute making homosexual intercourse a
crime).
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a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice."" The Court
noted that the law criminalizing homosexual intercourse did not regulate sexual
activity with children, sexual imposition on non-consenting persons, public acts of
indecency, prostitution, or marriage.22 The issue framed by the Court was whether
the "profound and deep convictions" of the majority of people in the state
condemning homosexuality as immoral were sufficient to support the constitutional-
ity of the law. 3 The Court concluded that "[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate
21 Id. at 571 (quoting Justice Stevens's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,216
(1986)). The Supreme Court expressly overruled Bowers on this issue. In Bowers, the Court
ruled that morality, in and of itself, was a legitimate reason supporting legislation banning
"sodomy." The Court had stated:
Even if the conduct at issue here is not a fundamental right,
respondent asserts that there must be a rational basis for the law and
that there is none in this case other than the presumed belief of a
majority of the electorate in Georgia that homosexual sodomy is
immoral and unacceptable. This is said to be an inadequate rationale to
support the law. The law, however, is constantly based on notions of
morality, and if all laws representing essentially moral choices are to
be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very
busy indeed. Even respondent makes no such claim, but insists that
majority sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be
declared inadequate. We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the
sodomy laws of some 25 States should be invalidated on this basis.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196. See also Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560,574-75 (1991) ("[T]here is no basis for thinking that our society
has ever shared the Thoreauvian 'you-may-do-what-you-like-so-long-as-it-does-not-injure-
someone-else' beau ideal-much less for thinking that it was written into the Constitution.").
Justice Blackmun dissented in Bowers on the ground that morality in and of itself is not
sufficient justification to support criminalizing sodomy:
That certain, but by no means all, religious groups condemn the
behavior at issue gives the State no license to impose their judgments
on the entire citizenry. The legitimacy of secular legislation depends
instead on whether the State can advance some justification for its law
beyond its conformity to religious doctrine.
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 211 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
22 Justice Kennedy stated:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not
involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that
homosexual persons seek to enter.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
23 Justice Kennedy further stated:
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was
making the broader point that for centuries there have been powerful
2004]
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state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual." '24 In her separate concurring opinion in Lawrence, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor applied the same principle to equal protection cases, stating: "Moral
disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that is
insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal Protection Clause. 25
In the First Amendment context, the harm principle is the precept that people
are free to say what they want so long as they do not harm others.26 In recent
years, the Supreme Court has embraced the harm principle in determining the
constitutionality of laws under the First Amendment. The leading Supreme Court
voices to condemn homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation
has been shaped by religious beliefs, conceptions of right and
acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many
persons these are not trivial concerns but profound and deep
convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they
aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives. These
considerations do not answer the question before us, however. The
issue is whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce
these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law.
Id. at 577.
24 Id. at 578.
25 Id. at 582. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's reasoning is consistent with
a number of cases decided under the Equal Protection Clause where the Supreme Court has
held that mere dislike of a politically unpopular group is not sufficient to justify differential
treatment. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (In invalidating a state consti-
tutional amendment that blocked the adoption of gay rights legislation, the Court stated: "We
must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a proper legislative
end but to make them unequal to everyone else."); Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctrs., Inc.,
473 U.S. 432, 455 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring) (In striking down a city's refusal to issue
a special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded, the Court
stated: 'The record convinces me that this permit was required because of the irrational fears
of neighboring property owners, rather than for the protection of the mentally retarded
persons who would reside in home."); U.S. Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973) (In overturning a federal requirement disqualifying unrelated persons living together
from eligibility for food stamps, the Court stated: "The legislative history.., indicates that
the amendment was intended to prevent so-called 'hippies' and 'hippie communes' from
participating in the food stamp program."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886)
(In striking down the refusal of the San Francisco Board of Supervisors to issue permits to
persons of Chinese ancestry to operate laundries, the Court stated: "no reason for [the
refusal] exists except hostility.").
26 The principal focus of Mill's work, ON LIBERTY, is freedom of expression. See MILL,
supra note 17, at 15-52 (encompassing Chapter II, entitled Of the Liberty of Thought and
Discussion). See also Steven J. Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content
Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647,
656-57 (2002) [hereinafter Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy] (discussing the views of John
Stuart Mill and John Locke on freedom of expression).
[Vol. 13:125
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case recognizing the harm principle is Texas v. Johnson,27 in which the Court held
that people have a constitutional right to burn the American flag in protest. The
Court wrote, "[ilf there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it
is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable."2 8 In support of its ruling the
Court cited and quoted its 1943 decision in Barnette v. West Virginia, holding that
the government could not force children to say the Pledge of Allegiance:
In holding in Barnette that the Constitution did not leave
this course open to the government, Justice Jackson described
one of our society's defining principles in words deserving of
their frequent repetition: "If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein." 29
The harm principle is applicable whenever the government suppresses or
compels speech, but it does not apply when the government speaks3 or funds the
speech of others.3 1
2 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
28 Id. at 414.
29 Id. at 415 (quoting Barnette v. West Virginia, 319 U.S. 625, 642 (1943)).
30 The government is permitted to express and promote its point of view on any matter
except on the subject of religion. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (outlawing prayer
at public school graduation ceremonies). The Court explained:
The First Amendment protects speech and religion by quite
different mechanisms. Speech is protected by ensuring its full
expression even when the government participates, for the very object
of some of our most important speech is to persuade the government to
adopt an idea as its own. The method for protecting freedom of
worship and freedom of conscience in religious matters is quite the
reverse. In religious debate or expression the government is not a prime
participant, for the Framers deemed religious establishment antithetical
to the freedom of all. The Free Exercise Clause embraces a freedom of
conscience and worship that has close parallels in the speech provisions
of the First Amendment, but the Establishment Clause is a specific
prohibition on forms of state intervention in religious affairs with no
precise counterpart in the speech provisions.
Id. at 591 (citations omitted).
"' In Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), the Supreme Court upheld a federal law that
prohibited federally-funded family planning agencies from counseling, referring, or
providing information regarding abortion services. The Court distinguished this law from one
that suppresses speech, noting: "[W]e have here not the case of a general law singling out
a disfavored group on the basis of speech content, but a case of the Government refusing to
20041
WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
According to John Stuart Mill, the mere fact that people disagree with or
disapprove of an idea is not a "harm" that justifies suppressing expression of the
idea. Mill stated: "If all mankind minus one were of one opinion, mankind would
be no more justified in silencing that one person than he, if he had the power, would
be justified in silencing mankind. ' 32 The Supreme Court has agreed with this
corollary of the harm principle by embracing a virtual per se rule against viewpoint
based laws.33 Viewpoint based laws are laws that suppress expression of one point
of view merely because the lawmakers disagree with that point of view. Professor
Elena Kagan draws this connection between the harm principle and the rule against
viewpoint based laws:
[Tihe government may not restrict expressive activities because
it disagrees with or disapproves of the ideas espoused by the
speaker; it may not act on the basis of a view of what is a true
(or false) belief or a right (or wrong) opinion. Or, to say this in
a slightly different way, the government cannot count as a
harm, which it has a legitimate interest in preventing, that ideas
it considers faulty or abhorrent enter the public dialogue and
challenge the official understanding of acceptability or correct-
ness.
34
The prohibition on viewpoint based laws must not be confused with the
presumptive invalidity of content based laws. Laws that are viewpoint based -
that suppress one point of view and not the other - are per se invalid. 35 Laws that
are content based - that suppress expression of any point of view dealing with a
particular topic-are merely presumed invalid.36 Content based laws will be upheld
fund activities, including speech, which are specifically excluded from the scope of the
project funded." Id. at 194-95. See also Nat'l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S.
569, 572 (1998) (The Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal law that required the
National Endowment for the Arts to "tak[e] into consideration general standards of decency
and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public" in making grants for
artistic projects.) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)(1)). In Finley, the Court stated: "Government
may allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be impermissible were
direct regulation of speech or a criminal penalty at stake." Id. at 587-88.
32 MILL, supra note 17, at 16.
3 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of
Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 49, 56 (2000)
("[V]iewpoint restrictions have never been upheld.").
I Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHi. L. REv. 413, 428 (1996).
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
36 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based regulations
are presumptively invalid.").
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if the harm caused by the speech is sufficient to justify the suppression of speech.
For example, in Burson v. Freeman,37 the Supreme Court upheld a state law that
outlawed electioneering within 100 feet of a polling place on election day.3' A
majority of the Court held that this statute was a content based law restricting
political speech, and accordingly, that the statute should be reviewed under strict
scrutiny.39 A plurality of the Court found that the law was narrowly tailored to serve
the state's compelling governmental interests of discouraging voter intimidation and
election fraud, and that accordingly, the presumption of invalidity was overcome
and the law was valid.' Writing for the plurality, Justice Blackmun stated: "In
conclusion, we reaffirm that it is the rare case in which we have held that a law
survives strict scrutiny."" In contrast, if the law had purported to ban representa-
tives of one political party from the polling place but not the other, the law would
have been viewpoint based and unconstitutional.4 2
The confusion between the absolute prohibition against viewpoint based laws
and the mere presumption against the validity of content based laws may be traced
to language in the decision of the Supreme Court in Police Department of Chicago
37 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding a state statute prohibiting solicitation of votes or
display of campaign materials within 100 feet of polling place on election day).
38 See id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).
39 Id. at 198 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion) ("As a facially content-based restriction on
political speech in a public forum, § 2-7-11 1(b) must be subjected to exacting scrutiny: The
State must show that the 'regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end."') (citing Perry Ed. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,45 (1983)). Three Justices concurred with Justice Blackmun's opinion.
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion stating that the statute's limitation on expression
was valid only because it served another fundamental right, i.e., the right to vote. Id. at
213-14 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment
on the ground that according to American tradition there was no right to solicit votes or
distribute campaign materials at the polling place, and that therefore the environs of a
polling place is not a "traditional public forum." Id. at 216 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justices
Stevens, O'Connor, and Souter agreed with the plurality that "Tennessee must show that its
,regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end."' Id. at 217 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). However, the
dissenting Justices found that Tennessee had not met its burden of proof. Id. Justice Thomas
did not participate in the decision.
I d. at 209-11 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).
I ld. at 211 (Blackmun, J., plurality opinion).
42 Justice Scalia implied that a viewpoint based law would have been struck down when
he observed: "I believe that §2-7-111, though content based, is constitutional because it is
a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral regulation of a nonpublic forum. I therefore concur in the
judgment of the Court." Id. at 214 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added). He added, "[flor
the reasons that the plurality believes §2-7-111 survives exacting scrutiny, I believe it is at
least reasonable; and respondent does not contend that it is viewpoint discriminatory." Id. at
216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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v. Mosley, 3 where the Court stated: "But, above all else, the First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its
ideas, its subject matter, or its content."' In the same case the Court reiterated:
"The regulation [in question] 'thus slip(s) from the neutrality of time, place, and
circumstance into a concern about content.' This is never permitted. 45
In R.A. V., Justice Stevens explained that despite the broad dicta in Mosley,
content based laws may be upheld if the government is able to justify the intrusion
on speech:
Although the Court has, on occasion, declared that content-
based regulations of speech are "never permitted," [citing
Mosley] such claims are overstated. Indeed, in Mosley itself, the
Court indicated that Chicago's selective proscription of nonlabor
picketing was not per se unconstitutional, but rather could be
upheld if the city demonstrated that nonlabor picketing was
"clearly more disruptive than [labor] picketing." Contrary to the
broad dicta in Mosley and elsewhere, our decisions demonstrate
that content-based distinctions, far from being presumptively
invalid, are an inevitable and indispensable aspect of a coherent
understanding of the First Amendment.'
In R.A. V., Justice Scalia gave an example that concisely illustrates the difference
between content based and viewpoint based laws: "Thus, the government may
proscribe libel; but it may not make the further content discrimination of proscribing
only libel critical of the government."47
Among the most challenging freedom of expression cases that the Court has
considered in recent years are those involving hate speech and child pornography.
It is in these cases that the Court's application of the harm principle has been most
obvious. For example, in the case of R.A.V., Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
struck down a city ordinance banning hate speech in part because he considered the
law to be "viewpoint based." Justice Scalia explained:
41 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (striking down a municipal ordinance prohibiting all picketing
within 150 feet of a school except for peaceful labor picketing).
4 Id. at 95.
41 Id. at 99 (citation omitted) (quoting Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public
Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 29).
'0 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 420 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing
and quoting Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99-100 (1972)). See also
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573 (2002) ("However, this principle, like other First
Amendment principles, is not absolute.").
4' R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 384.
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In its practical operation, moreover, the ordinance goes
even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint
discrimination. Displays containing some words - odious racial
epithets, for example - would be prohibited to proponents of all
views. But "fighting words" that do not themselves invoke race,
color, creed, religion, or gender - aspersions upon a person's
mother, for example - would seemingly be usable ad libitum in
the placards of those arguing in favor of racial, color, etc.,
tolerance and equality, but could not be used by those speak-
ers' opponents. One could hold up a sign saying, for example,
that all "anti-Catholic bigots" are misbegotten; but not that all
"papists" are, for that would insult and provoke violence "on the
basis of religion." St. Paul has no such authority to license one
side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to
follow Marquis of Queensberry rules.48
Justice Stevens concurred in the result reached by the Court, but did not agree with
the Court's characterization of the law as viewpoint based. Rather, he concluded
that the city ordinance was aimed at harms and not at ideas:
Significantly, the St. Paul ordinance regulates speech not on
the basis of its subject matter or the viewpoint expressed, but
rather on the basis of the harm the speech causes. In this regard,
the Court fundamentally misreads the St. Paul ordinance. The
Court describes the St. Paul ordinance as regulating expression
"addressed to one of [several] specified disfavored topics," as
policing "disfavored subjects," and as "prohibit[ing] ... speech
solely on the basis of the subjects the speech addresses."
Contrary to the Court's suggestion, the ordinance regulates only
a subcategory of expression that causes injuries based on "race,
color, creed, religion or gender," not a subcategory that involves
discussions that concern those characteristics.49
In a footnote to his opinion, Justice Stevens identified the harm that flows from hate
speech: "One need look no further than the recent social unrest in the Nation's cities
to see that race-based threats may cause more harm to society and to individuals
than other threats. 50
In 2003, the Supreme Court returned to the question of "content discrimination"
48 Id. at 391-92.
49 Id. at 433 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
50 Id. at 433 n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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within an "unprotected category" of speech in the case of Virginia v. Black.5' The
majority of the Court, applying Justice Scalia's reasoning from R.A.V., found that
the law forbidding cross burning as a form of intimidation was a permissible content
based distinction within a category of unprotected speech and upheld the law.52 The
dissenting Justices, led by Justice Souter, found that the law was an impermissible
viewpoint based law.53 The difference was that the majority considered the law as
aimed at the harms of cross burning (threats and intimidation),54 while the dissenting
Justices found that the reason for the content discrimination was disapproval of the
Ku Klux Klan and its racist message.55
The harm principle by itself cannot explain the great majority of instances where
laws affecting expression are declared unconstitutional. In most of these cases, the
government asserts that it is upholding an interest which is at least legitimate if not
important, and yet the law is nevertheless struck down because the interest in free
expression outweighs the governmental interest. Consistent with this observation,
Bernard Harcourt suggests that "although the harm principle formally remains a
necessary but not sufficient condition"56 in determining whether behavior may be
criminalized, the principle has become largely irrelevant because "non-trivial harm
arguments are being made about practically every moral offense.""7 Accordingly,
says Harcourt, the courts must "focus on the types of harm, the amounts of harms,
and the balance of harms."5 8 In the context of the First Amendment, in order to
conduct this balance it is necessary to measure the value of the particular expression
that the state is seeking to suppress. This leads us to the second fundamental
principle that governs the law of freedom of expression, a familiar concept that I
have dubbed the "value principle," which is described in the following section of
this Article.
51 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
52 See id. at 363 ("The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done
with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of
intimidation.").
13 See id. at 384 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (In distinguishing
the examples of permissible content discrimination set forth in the majority opinion in
R.A. V., Souter stated: "I thus read R.A. V.'s examples of the particular virulence exception as
covering prohibitions that are not clearly associated with a particular viewpoint, and that are
consequently different from the Virginia statute.").
5 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
5 See Black, 538 U.S. at 384-85 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
("[N]o content-based statute should survive even under a pragmatic recasting of R.A.V.
without a high probability that no 'official suppression of ideas is afoot.' I believe the prima
facie evidence provision stands in the way of any finding of such a high probability here.")
(quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992)).
56 Harcourt, supra note 19, at 114.
57 Id.
58 Id.
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B. The Value Principle
The value principle is the idea that different categories of expression have
different values under the First Amendment, and that high value expression is
entitled to more constitutional protection than low value expression. This idea
may be traced to the 1942 decision of the Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,59 where the Court stated:
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment, it is well understood that the right
of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circum-
stances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited
classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These
include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the
insulting or "fighting" words - those which by their very
utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of
the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight
social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality.6°
The Supreme Court has declared that the so-called "unprotected" categories of
speech, like fighting words or obscenity, are not utterly devoid of constitutional
protection. In his majority opinion in the R.A. V. decision, Justice Scalia explained
that although "fighting words" are of low constitutional value, they are not altogether
outside the protection of the First Amendment:
[O]ur society, like other free but civilized societies, has permit-
ted restrictions upon the content of speech in a few limited areas,
which are "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by
the social interest in order and morality."...
We have sometimes said that these categories of expression
are "not within the area of constitutionally protected speech," or
that the "protection of the First Amendment does not extend"
59 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (holding that "fighting words" are not constitutionally protected)
(footnotes omitted).
6' Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
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to them. Such statements must be taken in context, however,
and are no more literally true than is the occasionally repeated
shorthand characterizing obscenity "as not being speech at all."
What they mean is that these areas of speech can, consistently
with the First Amendment, be regulated because of their consti-
tutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.) -
not that they are categories of speech entirely invisible to the
Constitution ... 6
Justice Scalia added:
It is not true that "fighting words" have at most a "de minimis"
expressive content, or that their content is in all respects
"worthless and undeserving of constitutional protection;"
sometimes they are quite expressive indeed. We have not said
that they constitute "no part of the expression of ideas," but only
that they constitute "no essential part of any exposition of
ideas."6 2
Concurring in the judgment in the same case, Justice Stevens observed that the
Supreme Court has established a "rough hierarchy" in the constitutional protection
that is accorded to each of the content-based categories of speech:
Our First Amendment decisions have created a rough
hierarchy in the constitutional protection of speech. Core
political speech occupies the highest, most protected position;
commercial speech and nonobscene, sexually explicit speech are
regarded as a sort of second-class expression; obscenity and
fighting words receive the least protection of all.63
Perhaps the nation's leading critic of the value principle is Professor Jed
Rubenfeld. Rubenfeld emphatically disagrees with the concept that the Constitution
recognizes different values of speech.'M He states that he "rejects the entire
apparatus of First Amendment balancing, including any 'high-value/low-value'
distinctions among different 'categories' of protected speech." 65 For example, he
61 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382-83 (citations omitted).
62 Id. at 384-85 (citations omitted).
63 Id. at 422 (Stevens, J., concurring).
6' See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment's Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REv. 767, 800
(2001).
65 Id. See also id. at 822-26 (criticizing the Chaplinsky framework of high-value/low-
value speech).
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argues that begging should receive the same protection from governmental
regulation as political speech. 66 A principal objection that Rubenfeld has towards
assigning "value" to different categories of speech is that it does not explain why
viewpoint based laws suppressing speech are unconstitutional per se. Rubenfeld
states that "the whole problem here is that the cost-benefit approach offers no
adequate explanation of the categorical First Amendment principle against view-
point discrimination.,, 67 Rubenfeld is correct in noting that the value principle does
not account for the rule against viewpoint discrimination. However, Rubenfeld's
analysis is incomplete, because the rule against viewpoint based laws is explained
by the harm principle.68
Professor Rubenfeld acknowledges that if the Court were to abandon the
hierarchical strategy of assigning values to different categories of speech, the
Court would have to overturn a number of established doctrines. For example, he
notes that laws against obscenity would almost certainly be deemed constitutional, 69
and that commercial speech would necessarily receive full First Amendment
protection.70 Professor Rubenfeld's proposals are explicitly prescriptive rather than
66 See id. at 798-801. Rubenfeld criticizes Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 117 F.3d
954 (1 1th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 966 (1999), which upheld a Fort Lauderdale
ordinance that prohibited begging in the beach area. Rubenfeld stated:
Does the First Amendment permit a city to decide that tourist dollars
are worth more than political advocacy in the city's parks or other
public places?
This question will not throw a balancer off-balance. He will say
that begging is just not as "weighty," for First Amendment purposes,
as "political speech." Political speech, he will say, has the highest First
Amendment value; begging has a much lower value.
... The whole high-value/low-value balancing-test approach to the
First Amendment, familiar as it is, and necessary as it is to support
cases such as Smith v. City of Fort Lauderdale, is unacceptable.
If Fort Lauderdale cannot arrest people on the beach for soliciting
votes or for criticizing the weather, it should not be able to arrest them
for soliciting alms.
Id. at 800-01.
67 id. at 825.
68 See supra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
6 See Rubenfeld, supra note 64, at 830 (discussing that "laws banning obscenity would
almost certainly be unconstitutional under the theory I have been developing here").
70 See id. ("Commercial speech, however, could no longer be treated as a second-class
First Amendment citizen."). Rubenfeld contends that the Court is moving in the direction of
according full First Amendment protection to commercial speech. See id. ("These
conclusions may run counter to some of the language of the older commercial speech cases,
but they are consistent with the recent cases, which arguably have arrived at this result
already.").
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descriptive of current doctrine.
The value principle has had an enduring impact on the law governing freedom
of expression. In countless cases the result has turned upon the value that the
Supreme Court has ascribed to the expression. If the Court finds that a particular
category of expression has little value, it is unlikely to invalidate a law restricting
such expression. For example, in upholding a public nudity law as applied to nude
dancing in Erie v. Pap's A.M.,7 1 the plurality opinion stated that "nude dancing of
the type at issue here is expressive conduct, although we think that it falls only
within the outer ambit of the First Amendment's protection., 72 Similarly, if the
Court considers that the value of a form of expression is high, it is likely to strike
down a law that suppresses it. For example, the Court reversed a defendant's
conviction for disturbing the peace where the information being communicated in
vulgar language was political speech, 73 and it reversed a judgment against a radio
station for violation of privacy laws where the station broadcast illegally recorded
conversations that involved matters of public importance.74
The value principle has played a particularly critical role in the Court's analysis
of the constitutionality of laws banning child pornography. In New York v. Ferber,75
although the Court unanimously upheld a New York State statute as applied to films
of young boys masturbating,76 several Justices expressed reservations about the
constitutionality of the law as applied to works containing significant literary or
scientific value.7 7 Similarly, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,7s Justice Kennedy
" 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (upholding a law prohibiting public nudity as applied to nude
dancing establishment).
72 Id. at 289 (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565-66 (1991)).
7 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (197 1) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits
the conviction of a defendant who walked through a courthouse corridor wearing a jacket
bearing the words, "Fuck the Draft.").
7' Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (holding that the First Amendment prohibits
a suit brought under state and federal privacy laws against a radio station that broadcasted
a tape of an illegally intercepted cellphone conversation involving matters of public
importance.).
'5 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding a state law forbidding distribution of material
depicting a sexual performance by a child under the age of sixteen).
71 See id. at 752.
77 See id. at 775 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated:
On the other hand, it is quite possible that New York's statute is
overbroad because it bans depictions that do not actually threaten the
harms identified by the Court. For example, clinical pictures of
adolescent sexuality, such as those that might appear in medical
textbooks, might not involve the type of sexual exploitation and abuse
targeted by New York's statute. Nor might such depictions feed the
poisonous "kiddie porn" market that New York and other States have
attempted to regulate. Similarly, pictures of children engaged in rites
widely approved by their cultures, such as those that might appear in
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struck down the Child Pornography Protection Act in part on the ground that the
sexuality of minors is a prominent theme of classical and contemporary artists. 79
In the course of the opinion, Justice Kennedy cited examples of such works
including Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet and the movies Traffic and American
Beauty.0 Kennedy's moving description of these works emphasizes the value of
such depictions:
Our society, like other cultures, has empathy and enduring
fascination with the lives and destinies of the young. Art and
literature express the vital interest we all have in the formative
years we ourselves once knew, when wounds can be so grievous,
issues of the National Geographic, might not trigger the compelling
interests identified by the Court. It is not necessary to address these
possibilities further today, however, because this potential overbreadth
is not sufficiently substantial to warrant facial invalidation of New
York's statute.
Id. See also id. at 776 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[I]n my view application of § 263.15 or any
similar statute to depictions of children that in themselves do have serious literary, artistic,
scientific, or medical value, would violate the First Amendment.").
78 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (striking down portions of the Child Pornography Protection Act).
" See id. at 247 ("Both themes - teenage sexual activity and the sexual abuse of
children - have inspired countless literary works.").
80 See id. at 247-48. Justice Kennedy stated:
William Shakespeare created the most famous pair of teenage lovers,
one of whom is just 13 years of age. In the drama, Shakespeare portrays
the relationship as something splendid and innocent, but not juvenile.
The work has inspired no less than 40 motion pictures, some of which
suggest that the teenagers consummated their relationship. Shakespeare
may not have written sexually explicit scenes for the Elizabethan
audience, but were modem directors to adopt a less conventional
approach, that fact alone would not compel the conclusion that the
work was obscene.
Contemporary movies pursue similar themes. Last year's Academy
Awards featured the movie, Traffic, which was nominated for Best
Picture. The film portrays a teenager, identified as a 16-year-old, who
becomes addicted to drugs. The viewer sees the degradation of her
addiction, which in the end leads her to a filthy room to trade sex for
drugs. The year before, American Beauty won the Academy Award for
Best Picture. In the course of the movie, a teenage girl engages in
sexual relations with her teenage boyfriend, and another yields herself
to the gratification of a middle-aged man. The film also contains a
scene where, although the movie audience understands the act is not
taking place, one character believes he is watching a teenage boy
performing a sexual act on an older man.
Id. (citations omitted).
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disappointment so profound, and mistaken choices so tragic, but
when moral acts and self-fulfillment are still in reach.8'
Like the harm principle, the value principle is an integral part of First Amend-
ment law, affecting every decision where the Court must balance expressive rights
against the demands of an organized society. I suggest below that the value prin-
ciple not only establishes a hierarchy of categories of speech, but that it also
establishes hierarchies within categories.
C. Extending the Value Principle to Subcategories of Speech
The "rough hierarchy" established by the Court mandates the highest protection
for the categories of political, religious, literary, and scientific speech; middling
protection for commercial and indecent or offensive speech; and relatively little
protection for incitement, fighting words, defamation, obscenity, and child
pornography.8 2 However, the distinctions among categories of speech are far more
nuanced than this brief outline suggests. A review of cases reveals that the Supreme
Court has drawn distinctions within each category of speech. The Court has created
a number of de facto subcategories of speech based upon its estimation of the
potential value of each specific subcategory. For example, political speech may
include advocacy, incitements, threats, or insults,83 which are arranged hierarchically
in that order.
To prohibit political advocacy, the government must prove that the law is
necessary to achieve a compelling governmental interest." Incitements may be
banned if the threatened violence is likely, imminent, and serious.85 "True threats"
are "statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an
intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of
individuals,"8 6 while insults are punishable only if they are directed at an individual
in a face-to-face confrontation.87 The necessary showing of harm decreases as we
81 Id. at 248.
82 See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
83 Obviously, advocacy, incitements, threats, and insults may also be non-political.
4 See discussion of Burson v. Freeman, supra note 39 and accompanying text.
5 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam)
[Tihe constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action.
Id.
86 See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
" See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (defining "fighting words" as
"what men of common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an
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descend the scale of value. The Court deems the relatively low level harm of
provocation sufficient to punish insults because insults "are of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."8'
Commercial speech admits of at least two internal hierarchies. Informational
commercial speech such as price advertising or the labeling of contents has received
vigorous protection from the Court,89 while promotional advertising has on occasion
not been protected.90 Another hierarchy of commercial speech is dependent upon
average addressee to fight").
88 Id. at 572.
£8 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (striking down a state
statute prohibiting advertising of prices for liquor); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S.
476 (1995) (striking down a federal law prohibiting beer labels from displaying alcohol
content); Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Consumer Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748
(1976) (striking down a state statute prohibiting licensed pharmacists from advertising the
prices of prescription drugs). In 44 Liquormart, Inc., the Court stated, "the State retains less
regulatory authority when its commercial speech restrictions strike at 'the substance of the
information communicated' rather than the 'commercial aspect of [it] - with offerors
communicating offers to offerees."' 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 499 (quoting Linmark
Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977)).
' See Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328
(1986) (upholding a Puerto Rico statute restricting advertising of casinos to Puerto Rico
residents). But see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (striking down state
regulations restricting tobacco advertising); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (striking down a state regulation imposing a
total ban on promotional advertising by an electrical utility). Professor Paul Horwitz has
argued that some forms of promotional advertising should be categorized as "misleading"
and therefore regulatable:
As commercial speech has become less a vehicle for the direct trans-
mission of information, and more a vehicle for the transmission of
images, symbols, and the sending of signals about the "lifestyle" to
which a product is supposed to correspond, more commercial speech
has become broadly "misleading" even as it becomes more difficult to
judge the truth or falsity of that speech.
Paul Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis: Heuristics, Biases, and Institutions in the First
Amendment, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 60 [hereinafter Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis]
2003).
The hierarchy granting enhanced First Amendment value to informational commercial
speech over promotional commercial speech is reversed, however, in the area of compelled
commercial speech. Laws that require disclosure of information useful to consumers are
likely to be upheld. See 44 Liquormart, Inc., 517 U.S. at 498 ("[T]he state may require
commercial messages to 'appear in such a form, or include such additional information,
warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive."') (quoting Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Consumer Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772, n. 24
(1976)). But see Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 1996) (invalidating
a state law requiring retailers to label products from cows treated with growth hormone).
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the type of activity being advertised. Advertising of constitutionally protected
activity receives the highest protection, 9' followed by advertising of products and
services that are lawful,92 and last, commercial speech regarding illegal products or
services.93 Previously, the Supreme Court had held that advertising for "vice"
products or services such as gambling could be restricted, not only to children and
unwilling listeners, but also to consenting adults.9' More recently, the Court has
indicated that advertising for these products should stand on the same basis as
advertising for other lawful products.95
However, a company's refusal to join forced promotion of products is in some cases
constitutionally protected. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405 (2001)
(striking down USDA assessments for mushroom advertising). But see Glickman v. Wileman
Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997) (upholding a USDA assessment for generic
advertising for California fruits). See generally Edward J. Schoen et al., United Foods and
Wileman Bros.: Protection Against Compelled Commercial Speech - Now You See It, Now
You Don't, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 467 (2002) (discussing the compelled commercial speech
doctrine).
9' See Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (invalidating a federal statute
prohibiting the mailing of unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1978) (invalidating a state's prohibition on advertisements for
contraceptive products); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) (In striking down a
state statute prohibiting any publication encouraging abortions as applied to advertisement
for abortion clinic, the Court stated: "[I]n this case, appellant's First Amendment interests
coincided with the constitutional interests of the general public.").
92 See Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 563-64 ("[T]here can be no constitutional
objection to the suppression of commercial messages that do not accurately inform the public
about lawful activity. The government may ban forms of communication more likely to
deceive the public than to inform it, or commercial speech related to illegal activity."); Va.
State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 (striking down a prohibition on advertising of
prescription drug prices in part because "there is no claim that the transactions proposed in
the forbidden advertisements are themselves illegal in any way").
"' See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973) (upholding a municipal agency order prohibiting gender-designated help-wanted
advertisements).
" See Posados de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328
(1986) (upholding a Puerto Rico statute and regulations restricting advertisements for casino
gambling directed at Puerto Rico residents). See also United States v. Edge Broadcasting
Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (upholding a federal regulation prohibiting broadcaster in non-
lottery states from broadcasting lottery advertisements).
" See Lorrilard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001) (striking down a number of
restrictions on indoor and outdoor advertisements for tobacco products); Greater New
Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999) (striking down a
federal restriction on advertising of casino gambling as applied to broadcasters located in a
state where such gambling is allowed); Michael Hoefges & Milgros Rivera-Sanchez, "Vice"
Advertising Under the Supreme Court's Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Shifting Central
Hudson Analysis, 22 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 345, 388 (2000) ("[A] strong argument
exists that the 'vice' distinction retains little, if any, legal significance under the current
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The extent of constitutional protection for public disclosure of confidential
information depends upon the nature of the information disclosed. A number of
Supreme Court decisions have struck down privacy and confidentiality laws as
applied to matters of public importance.96 For example, the Court recently held
that a radio station has the right to broadcast a recording of a private conversation
between union leaders contemplating violence against their opponents. 97 Similarly,
the constitutional protection accorded to defamatory statements depends, in part,
upon whether the subject matter is a matter of public concern.98 This topic will
be examined in more detail in Part 1I of this article, which describes the different
standards that plaintiffs must meet in proving harm for each category of defamation.
The following section discusses the application of the harm principle and the value
principle to content neutral laws.
D. Application of the Value Principle to Content Neutral Laws
The "constitutional calculus" proposed by Justice John Paul Stevens in R.A. V.
identifies four elements, besides the content of the speech, that must be taken into
account in determining the constitutionality of laws that affect expression.99 These
factors are the "context" of the speech, the "character" of the mode of expression,
the "scope" of the law restricting speech, and the "nature" of the restriction.00 I
have described these elements at length elsewhere.' What follows is a brief
configuration of the commercial speech doctrine."). See also William W. Van Alstyne, To
What Extent Does the Power of Government to Determine the Boundaries and Conditions
of Lawful Commerce Permit Government to Declare Who May Advertise and Who May
Not?, 51 EMORY L.J. 1513, 1554 (2002) (arguing for application of "strict scrutiny" review
of laws restricting advertising of lawful products).
96 See Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990) (invalidating a state statute forbidding
grand jury witnesses from ever disclosing their own testimony); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g
Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979) (invalidating a state statute forbidding publication of the name of
ajuvenile offender as applied to a newspaper that lawfully obtained information); Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia,435 U.S. 829 (1978) (invalidating a state statute prohibiting
disclosure of confidential matters before a judicial review commission as applied to a
newspaper reporting that the commission was contemplating investigation of a state judge);
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (invalidating an injunction
issued by a federal court prohibiting publication of classified documents detailing history of
American involvement in Vietnam).
97 See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) (forbidding a civil suit against a radio
station under federal and state privacy laws for a broadcast of information of public
importance, where the radio station had lawfully obtained its information).
98 See infra notes 319-26 and accompanying text.
99 See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 429-30 (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing how "context,"
"character," "scope," and "nature" of restrictions on speech affect First Amendment analysis).
0 See id.
10! See Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality, supra note 4, at 846-50.
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summary of this theory.
The "context" or setting of speech - where the speech occurs - has a profound
effect on the constitutionality of any law affecting expression. Public forum analysis
- whether the speech occurs in a public forum, °2 a limited public forum,"3 a non-
public forum,"° or a setting that is not a forum at all" 5 - is an important factor in
standard First Amendment analysis. However, the public forum doctrine is not a
simple and straightforward principle. Rather, it entails a complex and nuanced
judgment about the necessity and appropriateness of the setting for purposes of
communication. Sidewalks, for example, are typically considered to be public
forums, but not all sidewalks are equivalent for First Amendment purposes. The
sidewalks outside a courthouse, 1 6 statehouse,0 7 or a diplomatic mission0 8 receive
more First Amendment protection than sidewalks abutting a post office,0 9 near an
abortion clinic,"0 or in front of a private residence."'
102 See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (striking down a municipal
ordinance forbidding public meetings in streets and other public places without a permit).
The Court stated: "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially
been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes
of assembly, communicating thought between citizens, and discussing public questions."
Id. at 515.
103 See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981)
(holding a state fair to be a limited public forum).
" See Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,676 (1998) (holding that
political debate on a state-owned television station is a "non-public forum"); Int'l Soc'y for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (holding that an airport is not a
public forum); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (holding that a jailhouse's driveway
is not a public forum).
'05 See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 672-75 (noting that a state-owned television station is not a
forum and therefore generally is not subject to the requirement of viewpoint neutrality).
'06 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (striking down a statute forbidding
obstruction of public passages as applied to peaceful demonstrators, and declaring the
municipal practice of conferring unfettered discretion upon local officials to regulate the use
of streets for peaceful parades and meetings to be unconstitutional).
.07 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (overturning the convictions of civil
rights demonstrators for breach of the peace as a result of a peaceful march on the sidewalk
around State House grounds).
"'8 See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (striking down a District of Columbia
provision forbidding demonstrations or displays of signs critical of foreign governments
within 500 feet of a foreign embassy).
109 See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion)
(holding that a sidewalk on post office property that links the post office to a parking lot was
a non-public forum).
"0o See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (upholding a state statute making it unlawful
to approach within eight feet of another person to pass a leaflet, display a sign, or engage in
oral protest, education, or counseling, if within 100 feet of a health care facility).
"' See Frisby v. Shultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (upholding a municipal ordinance prohibit-
ing targeted residential picketing).
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The "character" of an expression refers to the mode of communication -
speaking, writing, broadcasting, etc. - and this factor also has a substantial bearing
on the constitutionality of laws regulating expression." 2 Over fifty years ago,
Justice Robert Jackson observed that each type of media has different characteris-
tics that affect the constitutionality of laws restricting expression. Justice Jackson
stated that "[t]he moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the
sound truck, and the street comer orator have differing natures, values, abuses, and
dangers.""' 3 The vast expansion of avenues of communication wrought by the
information age has forced the Court to evaluate the differing "natures, values,
abuses, and dangers" of myriad emerging modes of communication. For example,
in recent years the Court has decided First Amendment cases involving restrictions
of expression on cable television," 4 over the intemet,"1 5 and by means of computer-
generated images."16
The "scope" of restrictions on expression obviously affects the analysis in that
narrowly tailored laws are more likely to be upheld. "' Laws that impose precisely
12 See Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality, supra note 4, at 848.
" Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring). See infra notes
138-42 and accompanying text (describing the differential treatment accorded newspapers
and the broadcast media regarding "right to reply" and "equal time" provisions).
114 See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (invalidating
a provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that required cable operators to either
"fully scramble" sexually explicit channels or to limit their hours of transmission); Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding the "must carry" provisions
of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992).
1 " See Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (considering the constitutionality of
a statute banning postings on the internet that are "harmful to minors" on the basis of
"contemporary community standards"); Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844 (1977) (invalidating
provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996, which attempted to protect minors
from "indecent" and "patently offensive" speech in the intemet).
116 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (invalidating a portion of
a federal statute that banned virtual child pornography).
".. See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens
stated:
Finally, in considering the validity of content-based regulations we
have also looked more broadly at the scope of the restrictions. For
example, in Young v. American Mini Theatres we found significant the
fact that "what [was] ultimately at stake [was] nothing more than a
limitation on the place where adult films may be exhibited." Similarly,
in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court emphasized two dimensions
of the limited scope of the FCC ruling. First, the ruling concerned only
broadcast material which presents particular problems because it
"confronts the citizen ... in the privacy of the home"; second, the
ruling was not a complete ban on the use of selected offensive words,
but rather merely a limitation on the times such speech could be
broadcast.
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targeted limitations on the time and place of expression are more likely to be upheld
than "total bans" on expression." 8 For example, a law that prohibits electioneering
within fifty feet of a polling place on election day is more likely to be upheld than
a broader limitation on political speech," 9 and an eight foot "bubble" around patients
visiting abortion clinics to prevent harassment by protestors' 2 is more likely to be
considered constitutional than a fifteen foot bubble.' 2'
In addition, the extent of laws regulating expression in terms of their "context,"
"character," and "scope" is central to First Amendment analysis because content
neutral laws must "leave open ample alternative channels of communication."' 
2
Id. at 431 (citations omitted).
118 See Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (striking down
a federal statute forbidding prohibiting "indecent" commercial telephone messages - "dial-
a-porn" services). The Court stated:
In attempting to justify the complete ban and criminalization of the
indecent commercial telephone communications with adults as well as
minors, the federal parties rely on F.C.C. v. Pacifica Foundation, a
case in which the Court considered whether the FCC has the power to
regulate a radio broadcast that is indecent but not obscene. In an
emphatically narrow holding, the Pacifica Court concluded that special
treatment of indecent broadcasting was justified.
Pacifica is readily distinguishable from these cases, most
obviously because it did not involve a total ban on broadcasting
indecent material. The FCC rule was not "'intended to place an
absolute prohibition on the broadcast of this type of language, but
rather sought to channel it to times of day when children most likely
would not be exposed to it."' The issue of a total ban was not before
the Court.
Id. at 127 (citations omitted). See also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 562
(200 1) (The Court struck down a restriction on outdoor advertising of tobacco products on
the ground that "[iun some geographical areas, these regulations would constitute nearly a
complete ban on the communication of truthful information about smokeless tobacco and
cigars to adult consumers."); Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 319 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (contending that a municipal ordinance prohibiting nudity constituted a "total
ban" on nude dancing).
... See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding a state statute prohibiting
solicitation of votes or display of campaign materials within 100 feet of polling places on
election day).
120 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000) (upholding a state statute creating a floating
eight foot bubble zone around health care facility patients).
' ' See Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357 (1997) (striking down
an injunction imposing a fifteen foot floating buffer zone around persons seeking to enter or
leave abortion clinic).
122 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994) (The Court struck down a
municipal ordinance banning the display of signs on residential property, noting that "even
regulations that do not foreclose an entire medium of expression, but merely shift the time,
place, or manner of its use, must 'leave open ample alternative channels for communication"')
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The "nature" of laws restricting speech includes the judgment as to whether the law
is a "prior restraint" or a "subsequent punishment." 23 Prior restraints are held to a
stricter standard than subsequent punishments. 24
The value principle applies to these content neutral aspects of communication
because laws that restrict the time, place, or manner of speech limit opportunities
for expression, opportunities which have constitutional value. The constitutional
calculus attempts to compare the value of the expression being regulated against the
harm being prevented. With respect to content neutral regulations, the lost value is
the extent to which freedom to communicate has been closed off by the law.
In summary, the harm principle demands that some harm must be shown before
any restriction on speech may be upheld, while the value principle measures both
the value of the ideas being suppressed (content) and the value of the modes of
communication being restricted (context, character, scope, and nature). At first
blush it might appear that the value principle is perfectly consistent with the harm
principle. However, in many cases there is an inherent tension between the harm
principle and the value principle. This tension is discussed in the following portion
of this article.
E. The Tension Between the Harm Principle and the Value Principle
The most eloquent statement of the purposes of the First Amendment remains
Justice Louis Brandeis's concurring opinion in Whitney v. California'25 delivered
over three-quarters of a century ago. In the course of his celebrated dissertation,
Brandeis articulated two fundamentally different objectives that freedom of speech
accomplishes. He stated:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end
of the State was to make men free to develop their faculties; and
(quoting Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
123 See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring). According
to Justice Stevens, the "nature" of a law also refers to whether the law discriminates on the
basis of viewpoint. Id. Viewpoint discrimination is a content based element, rather than
content neutral. Laws that run the danger of viewpoint discrimination are disfavored. See id.
at 388 ("[Where] the basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the very reason
the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable, no significant danger of idea or viewpoint
discrimination exists."); id. at 430 (Stevens, J., concurring) (referring to viewpoint
discrimination as "particularly pernicious").
124 See New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam)
("Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy pre-
sumption against its constitutional validity.") (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
'25 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (affirming the defendant's conviction for violation of a state
criminal syndicalism act).
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that in its government the deliberative forces should prevail over
the arbitrary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means.
They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage
to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to
the discovery and spread of political truth; that without free
speech and assembly discussion would be futile; that with them,
discussion affords ordinarily adequate protection against the dis-
semination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the
American government.126
According to Brandeis, freedom of speech is both an end in itself and a necessary
means for creating and maintaining a "deliberative" political system and for
discovering and spreading political truth. 27
The harm principle and the value principle respectively reflect these personal
and social purposes of the First Amendment.'28 The harm principle arises from
concern for the dignity of the individual. In this regard, Brandeis celebrated not
126 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
127 See R. GEORGE WRIGHT, THE FUTURE OF FREE SPEECH LAW 255 (1990) ("[F]ree
speech values include the ascertainment of truth, promotion of political democracy, and self-
realization or development."). See also THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION (1970) (articulating four main premises that support the First Amendment).
Professor Emerson identified the following four purposes served by the First Amendment:
First, freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring
individual self-fulfillment....
Second, freedom of expression is an essential process for advanc-
ing knowledge and discovering truth....
Third, freedom of expression is essential to provide for partici-
pation in decision making by all members of society....
Finally, freedom of expression is a method of achieving a more
adaptable and hence a more stable community, of maintaining the
precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus.
Id. at 6-7.
128 See MARK A. GRABER, TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH 216 (1991) (noting that the
personal and social purposes of the First Amendment emerged at different times historically)
("Conservative libertarianism expressed the value that late nineteenth-century thinkers placed
on individual rights. Civil libertarianism expresses the value that twentieth-century thinkers
place on democratic processes."). See also Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An
Inquiry into the Foundations and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275,
1317-55 (1998) [hereinafter Heyman, Righting the Balance] (exploring the individual and
social values underlying the First Amendment).
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only the right "to think as you will and to speak as you think," 129 but also "the right
to be let alone." 130 In contrast, the value principle arises from the social benefits
of the freedom of speech, a concept that was developed by Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes. However, Justice Holmes can hardly be considered a champion of
individual liberty. 13' For example, Justice Holmes scorned the notion that the
Constitution enshrines libertarian principles such as laissezfaire economics.'32 But
129 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).
130 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Justice Brandeis stated:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions
favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew
that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be
found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the government, the right to be let alone - the
most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the govern-
ment upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed,
must be deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. See also Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy, supra note 26, at 657 ("Brandeis's rhetoric
underscores the close relationship that the liberal tradition has always perceived between
those freedoms and the idea of privacy.").
131 See generally Rodney A. Smolla, The Trial of Oliver Wendell Holmes, 36 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 173 (1994) (bringing to life the intellectual triumphs and moral shortcomings
of Justice Holmes's jurisprudence).
131 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes stated:
This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part
of the country does not entertain. If it were a question whether I agreed
with that theory, I should desire to study it further and long before
making up my mind. But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because
I strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do
with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law. It is settled
by various decisions of this court that state constitutions and state laws
may regulate life in many ways which we as legislators might think as
injudicious, or if you like as tyrannical, as this, and which, equally
with this, interfere with the liberty to contract. Sunday laws and usury
laws are ancient examples. A more modern one is the prohibition of
lotteries. The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does
not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, which has been
a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is interfered with by school
laws, by the Postoffice, by every state or municipal institution which
takes his money for purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or
not. The 14th Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social
Statics.
Id. at64.
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the old pragmatist'33 endowed us with the most memorable metaphor in American
free speech jurisprudence: the marketplace of ideas. Dissenting in Abrams v. United
States,1 3 4 Justice Holmes said that "the best test of truth is the power of the thought
to get itself accepted in the competition of the market."' 35 He was skeptical of
absolute truth,' 36 but he firmly believed that the people have the right to discover
their own version of the truth. For example, Justice Holmes observed: "If in the
long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted
by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free speech is that
they should be given their chance and have their way."'3 7 Justice Holmes and Justice
Brandeis conceived the First Amendment as guaranteeing the people the freedom
to express the truth as they see it and the opportunity to persuade others to see their
point of view.
Accordingly, the harm principle protects personal autonomy while the value
principle promotes popular sovereignty. However, the harm principle and the
value principle do not always work in harmony, because there are occasions where
personal autonomy clashes with popular sovereignty. The expressive choices that
individuals make often interfere with the democratic process or the search for truth.
In such cases, the Court must decide whether the rights of speakers to express
themselves or the rights of the public to receive information should prevail. In some
instances, the Court has elevated the right of individuals to say what they want, but
in others the Court has deemed that the interest of society in the free trade of ideas
trumps individual autonomy.
Conflicts between the expressive rights of speakers and the expressive needs
of society inevitably arise in situations where the speaker controls access to an
important medium of communication. '38 For example, in Miami Herald Publishing
1' See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REv. 787, 788
(1989) (describing Justice Holmes's thought as the "jurisprudential development of certain
central tenets of American pragmatism").
134 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (affirming the defendants' convictions for violation of the federal
Espionage Act).
13 Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
136 See THE FIRST AMENDMENT: A READER 28 (John H. Garrey & Frederick Schauer eds.,
1996) (Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Billings Learned Hand, June 24, 1918, stating,
"I don't bother about absolute truth or even inquire whether there is such a thing, but define
Truth as the system of my limitations.").
'7 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
138 See Nancy J. Whitmore, The Evolution of the Intermediate Scrutiny Standard and the
Rise of the Bottleneck "Rule" in the Turner Decisions, 8 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 25, 27 (2003)
(contending that the Court applied a lower level scrutiny in the Turner cases because it
perceived cable television as a "bottleneck" for communication). Professor Whitmore states:
The bottleneck characteristic of cable distribution provided the legal
reasoning the Court needed to overcome arguments by the Turner
Broadcasting System that the must-carry regulation was content-based
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Co. v. Tornillo'39 and Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC40 the Court considered the
constitutionality of laws that gave public officials and candidates a right to reply to
editorial attacks. The Court held that the right of reply statute was unconstitutional
as applied to a newspaper because of the importance of protecting the editorial
discretion of newspaper publishers,'4 ' but that such a policy was constitutional as
applied to the broadcasting industry because, in the case of radio and television, "[i]t
is the rights of viewers and listeners ... which is paramount." 1
42
Similarly, in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v.
FCC,143 the Court split over the question of the constitutionality of a law that gave
cable operators the right to refuse to carry indecent programming on leased access
because the purpose for enacting the rules was to "promote speech of
a favored content," "compel cable operators to transmit speech," favor
broadcast programmers over cable programming, and "single out
certain members of the press - here, cable operators- for disfavored
treatment." These purposes would most likely have justified application
of the strict scrutiny standard if the medium targeted was print, but
given the bottleneck characteristic of cable distribution, the Court
reasoned that heightened scrutiny was unwarranted.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Gretchen Sween, Rituals, Riots, Rules, and Rights: The Astor
Place Theater Riot of 1849 and the Evolving Limits of Free Speech, 81 TEX. L. REv. 679,712
(2002) (Sween describes the Astor Place Theater Riot in part as reaction to attempts to limit
audience participation during theatrical performances, and notes that "[w]hen the mob was
in the theater, playing an active role in the ritual, it could be an invigorating, positive part of
the event.").
139 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (striking down state a statute requiring newspapers to allow
political candidates a "right of reply" to attacks).
140 395 U.S. 367, 391 (1969) (upholding the FCC's "fairness doctrine").
41 See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tanillo, 418 U.S. 241,258 (1974). The Court stated:
Even if a newspaper would face no additional costs to comply with
a compulsory access law and would not be forced to forgo publication
of news or opinion by the inclusion of a reply, the Florida statute fails
to clear the barriers of the First Amendment because of its intrusion
into the function of editors. A newspaper is more than a passive
receptacle or conduit for news, comment, and advertising. The choice
of material to go into a newspaper, and the decisions made as to
limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of
public issues and public officials - whether fair or unfair - constitute
the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It has yet to be
demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can
be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees of a free
press as they have evolved to this time.
Id.
142 Red Lion Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
14' 518 U.S. 727 (1996) (upholding in part and invalidating in part a federal law giving
cable operators the power to refuse to carry indecent programming).
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channels and public access channels. Justice Thomas compared cable operators to
newspaper publishers and voted to allow them editorial discretion to decide what
programming to carry on leased access and public channels.'" He contended that
cable programmers had no First Amendment right to access the cable platform. 45
Justice Kennedy contended that the cable television operators should be treated as
a common carrier, like telephone companies, who are obliged to act as a conduit
for the speech of others. 146 A common carrier, like a public forum, is open to all
users.'47 As a result, Justice Kennedy found that the cable platform should be
open to use by cable programmers, and that it was the cable operators who had no
rights that were at stake. 148 In contrast to Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy,
Justice Breyer, in his plurality opinion, balanced the rights of cable operators, cable
programmers, and the public 49 in deciding to uphold the law as to leased access
channels150 and to strike the law down as to public access channels.''
1" See id. at 817 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Like a freelance
writer seeking a paper in which to publish newspaper editorials, a programmer is protected
in searching for an outlet for cable programming, but has no freestanding First Amendment
right to have that programming transmitted.").
See id. (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46 See id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Laws requiring
cable operators to provide leased access are the practical equivalent of making them common
carriers, analogous in this respect to telephone companies: They are obliged to provide a
conduit for the speech of others.").
117 See id. at 797-98 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("A common-
carriage mandate, nonetheless, serves the same function as a public forum. It ensures open,
nondiscriminatory access to the means of communication.").
14 See id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Kennedy
stated:
For purposes of these cases, we should treat the cable operator's rights
in these channels as extinguished, and address the issue these
petitioners present: namely, whether the Government can discriminate
on the basis of content in affording protection to certain programmers.
I cannot agree with Justice Thomas that the cable operator's rights
inform this analysis.
Id.
149 See DenverArea Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 747 (Breyer, J., plurality
opinion) ("While we cannot agree with Justice Thomas that everything turns upon the rights
of the, cable owner, we also cannot agree with Justice Kennedy that we must ignore the
expressive interests of cable operators altogether.") (emphasis omitted); Jerome A. Barron,
The Electronic Media and the Flight from First Amendment Doctrine: Justice Breyer's New
Balancing Approach, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 817 (1998) ("[T]he new balancing analysis
highlights the entire gamut of interests in play.").
150 See DenverArea Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, 518 U.S. at 747 (Breyer, J., plurality
opinion). With respect to leased access channels, Justice Breyer stated:
The existence of this complex balance of interests persuades us
that the permissive nature of the provision, coupled with its viewpoint-
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The principles of speaker autonomy and public access also clashed in the two
Turner Broadcasting cases, 15 2 where the Court upheld provisions of federal law that
require cable operators to lease channels to local broadcast stations (the "must
carry" provisions).' 53 The majority, led by Justice Kennedy, found the "must carry"
requirement to be a content neutral law that was intended to preserve public access
to free broadcast television, 154 while the dissent, led by Justice O'Connor, found the
law to be a content based restriction of the cable operator's freedom of expression.'55
Another pattern where the personal and social purposes of the First Amendment
collide is where speech interferes with the democratic process. The classic example
of such a law is the one considered in Burson v. Freeman,'56 prohibiting political
neutral application, is a constitutionally permissible way to protect
children from the type of sexual material that concerned Congress,
while accommodating both the First Amendment interests served by
the access requirements and those served in restoring to cable operators
a degree of the editorial control that Congress removed in 1984.
Id.
's' See id. at 766 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion). With respect to public access channels,
Justice Breyer stated:
The upshot, in respect to the public access channels, is a law that
could radically change present programming-related relationships
among local community and nonprofit supervising boards and access
managers, which relationships are established through municipal law,
regulation, and contract. In doing so, it would not significantly restore
editorial rights of cable operators, but would greatly increase the risk
that certain categories of programming (say, borderline offensive
programs) will not appear. At the same time, given present supervisory
mechanisms, the need for this particular provision, aimed directly at
public access channels, is not obvious. Having carefully reviewed the
legislative history of the Act, the proceedings before the FCC, the
record below, and the submissions of the parties and amici here, we
conclude that the Government cannot sustain its burden of showing
that § 10(c) is necessary to protect children or that it is appropriately
tailored to secure that end.
Id.
52 Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (upholding
"must carry" provisions); Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622
(1994) (declaring "must carry" provisions of federal Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act to be content neutral).
3 See Turner 11, 520 U.S. at 224-25 (upholding "must carry" provisions).
's" See Tuner 1, 512 U.S. at 643-52 (finding the Act to be content neutral).
'5 See id. at 676 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I cannot avoid the conclusion that [the
law's] preference for broadcasters over cable programmers is justified with reference to
content.").
156 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (striking down a state statute prohibiting solicitation of votes or
display of campaign materials within 100 feet of polling place on election day).
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expression within 100 feet of a polling place on election day. Some legal scholars
would extend this principle to suppress types of expression that either denigrate the
democratic process itself or that degrade and marginalize groups of people within
society, thus damaging their ability to participate as full citizens.'57 For example,
Robert Bork believes that Justice Sanford was right and Brandeis and Holmes were
wrong on the question of whether "criminal advocacy" was punishable under the
First Amendment.1 5 Advocacy of criminal conduct, according to Bork, is punishable
because it necessarily denigrates the democratic process. 59 In contrast, under the
Holmes/Brandeis rationale adopted in Brandenburg, "mere advocacy" of unlawful-
ness is not punishable.' 6 Similarly, Professors Elizabeth Malloy and Ronald
Krotoszynski suggest that "harm advocacy" should be actionable. 6' They state:
Recently, many racist and anti-Semitic hate groups and other
fringe organizations have provided information in books and
over the internet on dedicated web sites on how to build bombs,
pollute water supplies, and build weapons. The time has come
to ask whether the social costs of such "Harm Advocacy" must
be taxed against individual victims and the community at large.
At least in some circumstances, the courts should be able to
impose the cost of this Harm Advocacy on the speaker, provided
that the rules used to assign such costs do not unduly chill
otherwise protected expression. 62
Other scholars have taken the position that pornography and hate speech should
be suppressed because the degradation and contempt inherent in such speech has the
effect of relegating its victims to second class status, thus substantially interfering
7 See infra notes 158 and 161.
See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some FirstAmendment Principles, 47 IND.
L.J. 1, 31 (1971) ("[L]ogic and principle appear to drive us to the conclusion that Sanford
rather than Brandeis or Holmes was correct in Gitlow and Whitney.").
"' See id. ("Advocacy of law violation is a call to set aside the results that political speech
has produced.... There should, therefore, be no constitutional protection for any speech
advocating the violation of law.").
'6o See supra note 85 (setting forth the standard for punishing incitement).
161 See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Recalibrating the Cost of
Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159 (2000)
(suggesting that "harm advocacy" should be proscribable under the First Amendment). See
generally Ian A. Kass, Note, Regulating Bomb Recipes on the Internet: Does First
Amendment Law Permit the Government to React to the Most Egregious Harms?, 5 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 83 (1996) (suggesting that government could constitutionally ban the
publication of "bomb recipes").
'62 Malloy & Krotoszynski, supra note 161, at 1166-67.
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with their ability to fully participate in society. 63 Professor Steven Heyman, for
example, maintains that "violent pornography may be banned because it violates
the rights of women to personality, personal security, and equality, as well as the
most fundamental right of all - the right to recognition."' 6 Similarly, proponents
163 See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 109 (1993) (arguing in favor of laws
prohibiting pornography and hate speech). Professor MacKinnon states:
Where is all this leading? To a new model for freedom of
expression in which the free speech position no longer supports social
dominance, as it does now; in which free speech does not most readily
protect the activities of Nazis, Klansmen, and pornographers, while
doing nothing for their victims, as it does now; in which defending free
speech is not speaking on behalf of a large pile of money in the hands
of a small group of people, as it is now. In this new model, principle
will be defined in terms of specific experiences, the particularity of
history, substantively rather than abstractly. It will notice who is being
hurt and never forget who they are.
Id. See also Joseph A. Giordano & Joseph Michellucci, American Free Speech v. Canadian
Hann to Society: A Comparative Analysis of Obscenity and Pornography as Forms of
Expression, 14 J. SUFF. ACAD. L. 1, 2 (2000). The authors attribute differences in Canadian
and American approaches to pornography to the tendency of Canadian establishment to
"protect free speech while incorporating safeguards designed to protect against expression
primarily offensive to females, minorities, and other groups historically perceived to have
been unfairly treated." The authors state:
Lastly, the notion of group rights is also not one that is well
received by American courts. On the other hand, the Canadian
approach which embraces the concept of "social harm" appears, at the
very least, partially anchored on group rights and the extension of
preferential treatment to some but not others....
Indeed, the Canadian pornography and obscenity laws strongly
favor females ....
Id. at 20-21.
' Steven J. Heyman, Ideological Conflict and the First Amendment, 78 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 531,617 (2003) [hereinafter Heyman, Ideological Conflict]. Consistent with his "rights-
based" approach to freedom of expression problems, however, Professor Heyman would
extend constitutional protection to non-violent pornography, including obscenity:
[V]iolent pornography may be banned because it violates the rights of
women to personality, personal security, and equality, as well as the
most fundamental right of all - the right to recognition. In this regard,
violent pornography also infringes the rights of the community as a
whole, by undermining the mutual recognition that constitutes the
community. The community also should have the right to exclude
pornography from the public sphere, to shield children from such
material, and to decline to subsidize such material. Contrary to the
Supreme Court's traditional doctrine, however, the community should
have no general power to ban material that it considers to be obscene,
for such a power is inconsistent with the autonomy of individuals to
determine the content of their own thought and expression.
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of laws regulating hate speech contend that "certain words and actions wound
minorities and contribute to their oppression." 1
65
The most significant contemporary conflict between the rights of speakers and
the preservation of the democratic process arises from efforts to adopt laws limiting
contributions and expenditures of money in political campaigns. 166 Supporters of
these measures claim that they reduce the corrupting influence of money on
political campaigns. 167 Opponents contend that these laws are in violation of the
First Amendment. 168  The movement for campaign finance reform achieved a
165 See Erika George, Words as Sticks and Stones: Naming the Harm of Racist Speech, 11
HARV. BLACKLETrER J. 221,222 (1994) (reviewing MARl J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT
WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
(1993)). Professor George states:
The authors maintain that an "absolutist" approach to First Amendment
jurisprudence does not adequately reflect the reality that certain words
and actions wound minorities and contribute to their oppression. They
not only state the case in favor of regulating racist speech, but also
provide a clear and concise statement of the intellectual foundations of
critical race theory.
Id. But see Anuj C. Desai, Attacking Brandenburg with History: Does the Long-Term Harm
of Hate Speech Justify a Criminal Statute Suppressing It?, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 353 (2003)
(reviewing ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: How HATE SPEECH PAVES THE
WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2002)). Professor Desai concludes:
In sum, although Tsesis's goal of preventing atrocities against
racial and ethnic minorities is laudable, he has not sufficiently
supported his view that a criminal law banning what he refers to as
"hate speech" would further that goal. Indeed, because he has not
adequately considered the potential for government abuse that his
proposal invites, his proposed law could very well do more harm than
good.
Id. at 394.
"6 See F.E.C. v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146-63 (2003) (upholding a prohibition on political
contributions from corporations as applied to a non-profit advocacy organization); Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377,392-98 (2000) (upholding a state statute setting limits
on contributions to candidates for state office); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976)
(upholding contribution limits and striking down expenditure limits contained in federal law).
167 According to the parties and amici, the primary interest served by the
[contribution and expenditure] limitations, and, indeed, the [Federal
Election Campaign] Act as a whole, is the prevention of corruption and
the appearance of corruption spawned by the real or imagined coercive
influence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions and
on their actions if elected to office.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25. See GRABER, supra note 128, at 233 ("No one has a right to use
economic privilege to magnify otherwise relatively weak political skills.").
168 See Martin H. Redish, Free Speech and the Flawed Postulates of Campaign Finance
Reform, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW 783, 785 (2001) ("[C]ampaign finance reform measures -
including both those which have been held constitutional and unconstitutional by the
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milestone legislative victory with the enactment of the McCain-Feingold measure. 69
The Supreme Court recently upheld McCain-Feingold in McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission, 170 after explicitly balancing the rights of speakers against the
need to rein in political corruption. 7 '
In cases where the harm principle and the value principle work at cross
purposes - that is, where the personal and social purposes of the First Amendment
conflict - the exercise of one person's freedom of speech infringes upon other
people's right to freedom of expression. However, freedom of speech cases arise
in many situations where there is not a conflict of expressive rights, but rather a
conflict between expressive rights and other governmental interests. This point is
developed in the following section.
F. Non-Speech Harms Also Justify Laws Regulating Expression
Professor Steven Heyman has eloquently written of the various harms that
speech may inflict, such as the invasion of unwilling listeners' privacy 172 or the
intentional infliction of terror or grief.173 However, Professor Heyman contends that
the law of freedom of expression should not be understood as balancing free speech
against state interests, 71 In an effort to avoid the incommensurability of comparing
rights against interests, Heyman has constructed a "rights-based" approach to
resolving freedom of expression conflicts.'75 Heyman has stated that the right to
Court - must be found to violate core notions of free expression.").
169 See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (McCain-Feingold), 2 U.S.C. § 431 et
seq.
170 124 S.Ct. 619 (2003) (upholding most provisions of McCain-Feingold against First
Amendment attack).
"71 See id. at 660-86.
72 See Heyman, Spheres ofAutonomy, supra note 26, at 674 ("Ultimately, however, there
cannot be an unlimited right to force communication on an unwilling individual if the idea
of listener's autonomy is to have any meaning.").
' See id. at 676 ("[M]ost people would experience fear upon receiving a threat of
violence, or intense grief at news of a loved one's death, and would regard these as serious
injuries.").
"' See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 128, at 1311-12 ("[B]alancing is
appealing from a common sense standpoint. From a theoretical perspective, however, bal-
ancing is perhaps the least coherent of the three approaches, for it is difficult to see how free
speech and state interests are to be balanced against each other.").
175 See Heyman, Ideological Conflict, supra note 164, at 534 (developing further the
"rights-based" model of the First Amendment). Professor Heyman states:
[A] central task of constitutional jurisprudence is to develop a common
language or framework within which to debate controversial issues....
I argue that such a framework can be found in a rights-based theory of
the First Amendment. On this view, First Amendment problems should
not be seen as conflicts between the right to free speech and other,
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freedom of speech may be subject to restriction whenever it invades the "funda-
mental rights" of others. 7 6 Heyman's approach is consistent with the distinction
that Ronald Dworkin draws between "principles" and "policies.' 7 7 According to
Dworkin, principles protect individual rights, while policies promote collective
goals. 7 ' Dworkin believes that while courts are competent to analyze and determine
legal principles, the adoption and application of policies are committed to the
legislative process. 7 9 One interpretation of Dworkin's theory is that courts may
define and limit rights by balancing competing "principles," but courts may not limit
rights by invoking "policies.'
incommensurable values. When understood in this way, such problems
may well appear to involve intractable conflicts between opposing
ideological positions. Instead, many First Amendment problems should
be understood as conflicts between free speech and other rights -
rights that are rooted in the same values as free speech itself. In this
way, it may be possible to develop some common ground in debates
over the First Amendment, or at least to develop a common language
within which those debates can take place.
Id.
176 See Heyman, Righting the Balance, supra note 128, at 1279 (stating that his "central
thesis is that free speech is a right that is limited by the fundamental rights of other
individuals and the community as a whole"). Professor Heyman describes First Amendment
cases as involving a "conflict of rights," stating "[c]onflicts between rights should be
resolved in light of their relative value, the relationship between them, and their respective
roles in the system of constitutional liberty." Id. at 1364. In a more recent work, Professor
Heyman describes these competing rights as follows:
The liberties protected by the First Amendment can be understood in
part on this level. Freedom of mind is an aspect of the right to one's
person, while the freedom to speak falls within the broader liberty to
act as one likes. But the idea of external freedom also encompasses
other rights - above all, the right to personal security, which can be
infringed by incitement and threats of violence. In this way, the same
principles that justify free speech also give rise to other rights which set
bounds to that freedom.
Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy, supra note 26, at 678.
177 See Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1057, 1067 (1975).
178 See id. ("Arguments of principle are arguments intended to establish an individual
right; arguments of policy are arguments intended to establish a collective goal.").
171 See id. at 1067-73.
180 For example, Dworkin characterizes Learned Hand's pragmatic balancing test as
requiring the weighing of "principles," not "policies." See, e.g., id. at 1077 ("Hand's formula,
and more sophisticated variations . . . do not subordinate an individual right to some
collective goal, but provide a mechanism for compromising competing claims of abstract
right."). However, at other points Dworkin admits the possibility that rights may be
circumscribed in the presence of overriding considerations of policy. See, e.g., id. at 1073
("Suppose it is conceded that the right to equality between races is sufficiently strong that
it must prevail over all but the most pressing argument of policy, and be compromised only
as required by competing arguments of principle.").
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I have previously argued that the distinction Ronald Dworkin draws between
the roles of principles and policies in judicial reasoning misconceives the nature of
the judicial process. 8' In my opinion, the factor that limits the use of policy
analysis in judicial reasoning is not the type of value that is at stake, but rather
whether it is possible to prove that a particular value is in fact a purpose of the
law. '82 In interpreting the law, the courts are called upon to identify the values and
interests that laws are intended to serve. Whether the law is constitutional text, a
statutory enactment, or an administrative regulation, the purpose of the law may
be to promote individual rights, collective goals, or a combination of both.'83 It is
both legitimate and appropriate for a court to interpret the law in a manner that is
consistent with its purposes, individual and/or collective."S'
In particular, in freedom of expression cases, the difficulty with the "rights-
based" approach is that the "rights" with which speech interferes need not rise to
the level of constitutional rights, and the harms that speech causes need not be
constitutional violations in order for the government to be justified in suppressing
the speech. In general, the Constitution delimits the powers of the government, but
it does not apply to the acts of individuals."8 The government may choose to
redress harms inflicted by individuals, but it is not constitutionally required to do
so. 86 It follows that the state may choose to protect peoples' reputations from injury
by individuals or private corporations, or it may refrain from protecting them; it may
choose to protect people from misleading advertising, or it may choose not to do so;
it may prohibit private acts of intimidation, or it may allow them. Moreover, the
government has discretion to protect individuals from mental or physical harm
181 See WILSON HUHN, THE FIvE TYPES OF LEGAL ARGUMENTS 135 (2002) [hereinafter
HUHN, FIVE TYPES].
182 See id. at 131. This is the second of five ways to attack policy arguments, which are:
1. Is the factual prediction accurate?
2. Is the asserted policy one of the purposes of the law?
3. Is the asserted policy sufficiently strong?
4. How likely is it that the decision in this case will serve this policy?
5. Are there other, competing policies that are also at stake?
Id.
See id. at 135-36.
18 See id.
185 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; art. II, § 1; art. III, § I (creating and vesting powers
in the legislative, executive, and judicial departments); art. I, § 9 (imposing limits on the
power of Congress); art. I, § 10 (imposing limits on the power of the states); amends. I-VIII
(identifying rights that the federal government may not infringe); amend. XIV (identifying
rights that the states may not infringe). There is one instance where the Constitution does
protect individuals against private action. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII (outlawing slavery).
186 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(ruling that a state had no constitutional duty to protect a child from being physically abused
by his or her father).
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inflicted by private actors, even if that private action involves constitutionally
protected activity. For example, a fetus is not a "person" within the meaning of the
Constitution, and therefore has no constitutional rights. 7 However, the state may
enact a law that prohibits a woman from aborting a viable fetus because the interest
of the state in protecting viable fetal life outweighs the procreative and bodily
integrity rights of the pregnant woman, unless abortion is "necessary to preserve the
life or health of the mother."'8 8 Similarly, laws proscribing expression such as child
pornography, incitement, threats, insults, and defamation are all addressed to prevent
physical and emotional harms that are not constitutional in origin, but are serious
harms that the government may prevent through the enactment of content based
laws.
The distinction between Heyman's "rights-based" approach and the "harm-
balancing" approach proposed in this Article may be partly semantic. Heyman
notes that John Stuart Mill himself indicated that the "harms" that justify limitations
on liberty include "not injuring the interests of one another; or rather certain
interests, which, either by express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought
to be considered as rights."' 89 Even if the distinction between these approaches is
semantic, in my opinion, it is often simpler to describe the purpose of laws
restricting expression as preventing "harms" rather than protecting "rights." For
example, in the campaign finance reform cases, preventing the harm of political
corruption is clearly a valid governmental interest, but it is difficult to characterize
this goal as promoting an individual right.
The principle that laws regulating speech may be justified by the desire to
promote collective goals and prevent non-constitutional harms is even more evident
in the analysis of content neutral laws. For example, restrictions on the operation
of sound trucks or music amplifiers,' injunctions against anti-abortion protestors, 91
187 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973) ("[T]he word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.").
188 See id. at 163-64. The Court stated:
With respect to the State's important and legitimate interest in
potential life, the "compelling" point is at viability. This is so because
the fetus then presumably has the capability of meaningful life outside
the mother's womb. State regulation protective of fetal life after
viability thus has both logical and biological justifications. If the State
is interested in protecting fetal life after viability, it may go so far as to
proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is necessary to
preserve the life or health of the mother.
Id.
89 Heyman, private correspondence on file with author (quoting MILL, ON LIBERTY,
supra note 17, ch. IV para. 3).
'"o See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding a municipal noise
regulation requiring performers in a park bandshell to employ municipal technicians to
operate sound equipment); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding a municipal
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and permit requirements for assemblies in public parks 92 all address non-First
Amendment concerns relating to noise abatement and orderly access to private and
public facilities. Content neutral laws, by definition, interfere with constitutionally
protected avenues of expression, but constitutional rights do not automatically
trump non-constitutional interests. Rather, the constitutionality of any law regu-
lating expression depends upon balancing "the liberty of the individual.., and the
demands of organized society."
1 93
In summary, three consequences emerge from the confluence of the harm
principle and the value principle. First, all laws limiting freedom of expression must
be justified on the basis that the expression will cause harm to others beyond mere
moral offense. Second, the harm that results from speech may consist of injury to
the free speech rights of others or other physical or emotional injury. Third, in
order for a law restricting speech to be considered constitutional, the degree of harm
resulting from speech must be greater than the value of the expression. The next
portion of this Article describes the elements that make up "proof of harm."
II. SCIENTER, CAUSATION, DEGREE OF HARM, NATURE OF HARM
Over half a century ago, in United States v. Dennis,'94 Judge Learned Billings
Hand articulated a formula for measuring the constitutionality of laws affecting
expression. According to Judge Hand, in rulings under the First Amendment, the
courts take into account both the seriousness and the likelihood of the harm resulting
from speech. He stated: "In each case they [the courts] must ask whether the gravity
of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech
as is necessary to avoid the danger."'' 95 However, Judge Hand altered the Holmes-
Brandeis analysis in one critical respect: he watered down the causation element by
ordinance prohibiting the use of sound trucks that emit loud or raucous noises).
' See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753 (1994) (upholding a thirty-six-foot
buffer zone and noise abatement around an abortion clinic's entrances but striking down
other aspects of an injunction against abortion protestors).
192 See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316 (2002) (upholding a municipal park
ordinance requiring users to obtain a permit before conducting events involving more than
fifty persons against facial attack).
'9' See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
stated that due process "has represented the balance which our Nation, built upon postulates
of respect for the liberty of the individual, has struck between that liberty and the demands
of organized society." Id. See also Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton,
536 U.S. 150, 165 (2002) ("We must also look, however, to the amount of speech covered
by the ordinance and whether there is an appropriate balance between the affected speech
and the governmental interests that the ordinance purports to serve.").
194 183 F.2d 201 (1950), affd 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (affirming defendants' convictions for
violating the Smith Act).
'95 See id. at 212.
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removing the requirement of "immediacy."' 96
The Supreme Court adopted Judge Hand's formula, 197 and as a result, the
Court's opinion was insufficiently protective of speech.'98 The central problem with
the Supreme Court's reasoning in Dennis was not that it utilized Judge Hand's
balancing approach, but rather that it failed to estimate properly the remoteness of
the threatened harm, and accordingly, it failed to evaluate properly the relative
weight of the freedom to advocate for unpopular political positions. It is not feasible
to extend categorical protection to all political speech because, at some point, lawful
political advocacy may become unlawful incitement. However, the Court in Dennis
failed to extend sufficient protection to political advocacy, a mistake which the
Court corrected eighteen years later in Brandenburg v. Ohio.199 In my opinion, if
196 See id. Judge Hand cast the relevant standard in terms of "probability" instead of
"remoteness:"
The phrase, "clear and present danger," has come to be used as a
shorthand statement of those among such mixed or compounded
utterances which the Amendment does not protect. Yet it is not a vade
mecum; indeed, from its very words it could not be. It is a way to
describe a penumbra of occasions, even the outskirts of which are
indefinable, but within which, as is so often the case, the courts must
find their way as they can. . . We have purposely substituted
"improbability" for "remoteness," because that must be the right
interpretation. Given the same probability, it would be wholly irrational
to condone future evils which we should prevent if they were
immediate; that could be reconciled only by an indifference to those
who come after us. It is only because a substantial intervening period
between the utterance and its realization may check its effect and
change its importance, that its immediacy is important; and that, as we
have said, was the rationale of the concurrence in Whitney v. People
of State of California. We can never forecast with certainty; all
prophecy is a guess, but the reliability of a guess decreases with the
length of the future which it seeks to penetrate. In application of such
a standard courts may strike a wrong balance; they may tolerate
"incitements" which they should forbid; they may repress utterances
they should allow; but that is a responsibility that they cannot avoid.
Abdication is as much a failure of duty, as indifference is a failure to
protect primal rights.
Id. (citation omitted).
197 See Dennis, 394 U.S. at 510 (adopting Judge Hand's formula for freedom of
expression).
198 See id. at 516-17 (upholding the convictions of persons who advocated an eventual
communist takeover).
'99 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
These later decisions have fashioned the principle that the consti-
tutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
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properly applied as it was in Brandenburg, the balancing approach is just as
protective of speech as is the categorical approach." °
Each of the four elements of harm - scienter, causation, and nature and degree
of harm - represents one aspect of the harm that may result from unregulated
speech. In any particular case, one element or another may assume priority
depending upon which aspect of the harm is most problematic. What follows is a
discussion of the Court's treatment of these "elements of harm" in recent cases,
beginning with the Court's identification of the precise harm that the law regulating
speech is intended to ameliorate.
A. The Nature of the Harm
The first step in analyzing the right-hand side of the constitutional calculus is
to identify the "harm" that the government is seeking to mitigate or prevent. In his
concurring opinion in Watchtower, Justice Breyer noted that the government has the
responsibility for articulating the governmental interest it is attempting to protect.2 '
In the 2003 case United States v. American Library Association, Inc.,202 the
central issue that divided the Court was the precise nature of the harm that the law
was intended to address. The federal law that was challenged in that case, the
Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA), required public libraries, as a condition
to receiving federal funding, to install internet filters that would deny patrons access
to obscenity and child pornography and prevent minors from accessing material
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.
Id. at 447.
201 See Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality, supra note 4, at 861 (arguing that the
"constitutional calculus" is as protective of speech as the categorical approach).
20 See Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, Inc. v. Viii. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 170
(2002) (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer stated:
In the intermediate scrutiny context, the Court ordinarily does not
supply reasons the legislative body has not given. That does not mean,
as The Chief Justice suggests, that only a government with a "battery
of constitutional lawyers," could satisfy this burden. It does mean that
we expect a government to give its real reasons for passing an
ordinance. Legislators, in even the smallest town, are perfectly able to
do so - sometimes better on their own than with too many lawyers,
e.g., a "battery," trying to offer their advice. I can only conclude that
if the village of Stratton thought preventing burglaries and violent
crimes was an important justification for this ordinance, it would have
said so.
Id. (citations omitted).
202 539 U.S. 194 (2003) (upholding a provision of the Children's Internet Protection Act
requiring public libraries receiving federal funds to use internet filters against obscenity,
child pornography, and, in the case of patrons who are children, material that is harmful to
children).
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harmful to children. °3 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and three other
Justices, implied that the purpose of CIPA was quite broad. The plurality suggested
that in addition to denying minors access to harmful materials and denying adults
access to illegal obscenity and child pornography, the law was also intended to
address the problem of adult patrons who were using public libraries to obtain
access to pornography. 2°4 The plurality opinion repeatedly returned to this theme
that libraries could and should prevent both adults and children from viewing
pornography.2 °5
The two Justices who concurred in the judgment of the Court and the three
dissenting Justices adopted a much narrower view of the valid purposes of the Act.
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment upholding the constitutionality of the
Act on the basis of assurances given by the Solicitor General in the oral argument
that adult library patrons had the right to demand the prompt disabling of internet
filters without significant delay,2°6 and stated that if adults were prevented from
viewing constitutionally protected materials, it could form the basis for an as-
applied challenge to the Act.20 7 Justice Breyer, also concurring in the judgment,
specifically identified the purposes of the Act as prohibiting adult patrons access to
obscenity and child pornography, and preventing children from gaining access to
material that is harmful to them.20 8 He concluded that requiring adult patrons to
203 Id. at 199 (Rehnquist, C.J., plurality opinion) ("Under CIPA, a public library may not
receive federal assistance to provide Internet access unless it installs software to block
images that constitute obscenity or child pornography, and to prevent minors from obtaining
access to material that is harmful to them.").
204 Id. at 200 ("The accessibility of this material has created serious problems for libraries,
which have found that patrons of all ages, including minors, regularly search for online
pornography.").
205 Id. ("Congress became concerned that the E-rate & LSTA [federal funding] programs
were facilitating access to illegal and harmful pornography."); id. at 201 n.3 ("Moving
terminals to places where their displays cannot easily be seen by other patrons, or installing
privacy screens or recessed monitors, would not address a library's interest in preventing
patrons from deliberately using its computers to view online pornography."); id. at 212
("[B]ecause public libraries have traditionally excluded pornographic material from their
other collections, Congress could reasonably impose a parallel limitation on its Internet
assistance programs.").
" See id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("If, on the request of an adult user, a librarian
will unblock filtered material or disable the Internet software filter without significant delay,
there is little to this case. The Government represents this is indeed the fact.").
207 If some libraries do not have the capacity to unblock specific Web
sites or to disable the filter or if it is shown that an adult user's election
to view constitutionally protected Internet material is burdened in some
other substantial way, that would be the subject for an as-applied
challenge, not the facial challenge made in this case.
Id. at 215.
20. See 539 U.S. at 218 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("The Act seeks to restrict access to
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request library officials to disable the internet filter was a "comparatively small
burden, 2 9 and that there did not appear to be any less burdensome alternative that
would nevertheless accomplish the government's purpose. 21" Like Justice Kennedy,
he suggested that if local practices under the Act substantially interfered with the
right of adults to access "overblocked" materials, this could be the subject of an as-
applied challenge to the Act.1
In their dissents, both Justice Stevens and Justice Souter argued that CIPA is
unconstitutional because it censors what adults can see. Justice Stevens observed
that the law "operates as a blunt nationwide restraint on adult access to 'an
enormous amount of valuable information' that individual librarians cannot possibly
review., 212 He characterized the law as an unlawful prior restraint.2l3 Justice Souter,
joined by Justice Ginsburg, agreed with Justice Stevens that the problem with the
Act was that it interfered with adult access to the internet. He stated, "if the only
First Amendment interests raised here were those of children, I would uphold
application of the Act. ' 214 He concluded that even if the internet filters had been
freely adopted by public libraries, this would constitute unlawful censorship of
adults' use of the internet.21 5
The disagreement between the plurality and the remaining five Justices did not
center on the validity or the necessity of blocking internet access to obscenity, child
pornography, or protecting children from exposure to harmful materials. Rather, it
concerned whether or not it is legitimate for libraries to forbid adults from viewing
obscenity, child pornography, and, in respect to access by minors, material that is comparably
harmful.").
209 See id. at 220 ("Given the comparatively small burden that the Act imposes upon the
library patron seeking legitimate Internet materials, I cannot say that any speech-related harm
that the Act may cause is disproportionate when considered in relation to the Act's legitimate
objectives.").
210 See id. at 219 ("Due to present technological limitations, however, the software filters
both 'overblock,' screening out some perfectly legitimate material, and 'underblock,'
allowing some obscene material to escape detection by the filter. But no one has presented
any clearly superior or better fitting alternatives.") (citations omitted).
211 See id. at 219-20 ("Perhaps local library rules or practices could further restrict the
ability of patrons to obtain 'overblocked' Internet material. But we are not now considering
any such local practices. We here consider only a facial challenge to the Act itself.")
(citations omitted).
212 Id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213 See 539 U.S. at 225 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Unless we assume that the statute is a
mere symbolic gesture, we must conclude that it will create a significant prior restraint on
adult access to protected speech.").
214 Id. at 232 (Souter, J., dissenting).
215 See id. at 234-35 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("A library that chose to block an adult's
Internet access to material harmful to children ... would be imposing a content-based
restriction on communication of material in the library's control that an adult could otherwise
lawfully see. This would simply be censorship.").
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pornographic materials that are constitutionally protected. The plurality implicitly
assumed that this was a legitimate purpose, while the dissenting Justices found that
it was not. The decision of the Court turned upon the nature of the harm that the law
was intended to address.
B. The Degree of the Harm
In the field of Constitutional law, perhaps the single most important jurispruden-
tial trend of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has been the increasing tendency
of the Supreme Court to base its analysis of the constitutionality of laws upon an
assessment of the degree of harm imposed upon individuals or society.216 In 1937,
the Supreme Court created the "affectation doctrine" that radically expanded
Congress's power under the Commerce Clause by reference to the degree of the
effect of adverse working conditions upon interstate commerce and the Nation's
economy.217 In 1954, the Court declared state-sponsored segregation in the Nation's
public schools unconstitutional because it "may affect [children's] hearts and minds
in a way unlikely ever to be undone." ' 8 In 1973, the Supreme Court acknowledged
a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy prior to viability because of the extent of
the physical, mental, and economic impact of unwanted pregnancy, childbirth, and
motherhood on women and their families.219 Most recently, in 2003, the Court
216 See MORTON J. HORWHTZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1870-1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 17-18, 199-200 (1992). See generally, Wilson Huhn, The
Stages of Legal Reasoning: Formalism, Analogy, and Realism, 48 VILL. L. REv. 305 (2003)
(explaining the functions of formalistic, analogistic, and realistic legal analysis and relations
among them).
217 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) ("Although
activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close
and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate
to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the
power to exercise that control."). The expansion of Congress's power authorized in Jones &
Laughlin Steel was presaged by Justice Cardozo's concurring opinion in Schechter, where
he rejected the formalistic distinction between "direct" and "indirect" effects in favor of a
realistic standard based upon the degree of the effect. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 554 (1935) (Cardozo, J., concurring) ("The law is not
indifferent to considerations of degree. Activities local in their immediacy do not become
interstate and national because of distant repercussions. What is near and what is distant may
at times be uncertain.").
218 See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) ("To separate them from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.").
219 Justice Blackmun stated:
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman
by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific and direct harm
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extended constitutional protection to the sexual conduct of gays and lesbians
because of the stigmatizing effect of criminalizing this behavior.220 In each of these
cases, the Court's decision turned upon its assessment of the seriousness of the harm
that would result from its determination of constitutionality.
This trend is also evident in First Amendment cases, and as with many other
First Amendment principles, it finds support in Justice Louis Brandeis's opinion
in Whitney v. California.2 Justice Brandeis expressly embraced the notion of
balancing the value of the expression against the seriousness of the anticipated harm
when he stated that political advocacy may not be suppressed "unless the evil
apprehended is relatively serious. ' 222 Justice Brandeis added, "[p]rohibition of free
medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy may be involved.
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a
distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent.
Mental and physical health may be taxed by child care. There is also
the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted child, and
there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it. In other cases, as in this
one, the additional difficulties and continuing stigma of unwed
motherhood may be involved.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
220 Justice Kennedy stated:
When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State,
that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.
The central holding of Bowers has been brought in question by this
case, and it should be addressed. Its continuance as precedent demeans
the lives of homosexual persons.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 575. Justice Kennedy added, "[t]he stigma this criminal
statute imposes, moreover, is not trivial." Id. Justice O'Connor similarly found the criminal
statute to be stigmatizing, stating:
[T]he effect of Texas' sodomy law is not just limited to the threat of
prosecution or consequence of conviction. Texas' sodomy law brands
all homosexuals as criminals, thereby making it more difficult for
homosexuals to be treated in the same manner as everyone else.
Indeed, Texas itself has previously acknowledged the collateral effects
of the law, stipulating in a prior challenge to this action that the law
"legally sanctions discrimination against [homosexuals] in a variety of
ways unrelated to the criminal law," including in the areas of
"employment, family issues, and housing."
Id. at 581-82 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201, 203
(Tex. App. 1992)). See generally Wilson Huhn, The Jurisprudential Revolution Unlocking
Human Potential in Lawrence and Grutter, 12 WM. & MARY BILLRTS. J. 65, 114-15 (2004)
(discussing how the Supreme Court is increasingly sensitive to the effect of laws on people's
lives).
221 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
22 Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the
means for averting a relatively trivial harm to society. '2 3  Justice Brandeis's
repeated use of the word "relatively" in this formula implies that the degree of the
harm must outweigh the value of the expression before the government is justified
in suppressing expression. Justice Brandeis's great contribution to First Amendment
analysis was not the adoption of a categorical rule protecting freedom of expression.
Rather, it was that he placed great value on political expression, which correspond-.
ingly required great proof of harm before the speech could be restricted. Justice
Brandeis illustrated this point by means of a hypothetical:
[A] State might, in the exercise of its police power, make any
trespass upon the land of another a crime, regardless of the
results or of the intent or purpose of the trespasser. It might,
also, punish an attempt, a conspiracy, or an incitement to commit
the trespass. But it is hardly conceivable that this court would
hold constitutional a statute which punished as a felony the mere
voluntary assembly with a society formed to teach that pedestri-
ans had the moral right to cross unenclosed, unposted, waste
lands and to advocate their doing so, even if there was imminent
danger that advocacy would lead to a trespass. The fact that
speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of
property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be
the probability of serious injury to the State.224
Recent First Amendment decisions of the Court are consistent both with the
larger jurisprudential trend towards consideration of harm and with Justice
Brandeis's admonition that the harm resulting from speech must be "relatively
223 Id. (emphasis added).
224 Id. at 377-78. See also Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (striking down an
anti-leafletting law). The Court expressly stated that in determining the constitutionality of
the law it was necessary to "weigh the circumstances" and "appraise the substantiality of the
reasons" for the law:
In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the rights
is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the
challenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respect-
ing matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed
at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as
diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of
democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult
task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise
the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation
of the free enjoyment of the rights.
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serious" before the speech may be suppressed. For example, in Virginia v. Black,225
the Court devoted several pages to describing the terrifying effect of cross burning
on the African-American community2 6 and voted to uphold the statute banning
cross burning because of that impact." 7 In New York v. Ferber,2 8 the Court based
its decision upholding a law proscribing child pornography on the finding that "[i]n
recent years, the exploitive use of children in the production of pornography has
become a serious national problem."" In cases restricting the location or nature of
sex businesses, the Court has expressly based its decisions upon the serious nature
of the harmful "secondary effects" of such businesses upon the surrounding
community.23° And the abortion protester cases have turned upon a careful weighing
of the protestors' right to freedom of expression against the interest of patients and
staff of abortion clinics to safety and freedom from harassment.
23
225 538 U.S. 343 (2003).
226 See id. at 352-57 (describing the history of cross burning from its origins in 14th
Century Scotland to recent times). The Supreme Court noted: "Members of the Klan burned
crosses on the lawns of those associated with the civil rights movement, assaulted the
Freedom Riders, bombed churches, and murdered blacks as well as whites whom the Klan
viewed as sympathetic toward the civil rights movement." Id. at 355-56.
227 See id. at 363 ("The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross burnings done
with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross is a particularly virulent form of
intimidation.").
228 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
229 Id. at 749.
230 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 435-36 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). Justice O'Connor stated:
The central component of the 1977 study is a report on city crime
patterns provided by the Los Angeles Police Department. That report
indicated that, during the period from 1965 to 1975, certain crime rates
grew much faster in Hollywood, which had the largest concentration
of adult establishments in the city, than in the city of Los Angeles as a
whole. For example, robberies increased 3 times faster and prostitution
15 times faster in Hollywood than citywide.
... [W]e find that reducing crime is a substantial government interest
and that the police department report's conclusions regarding crime
patterns may reasonably be relied upon to overcome summary
judgment against the city ....
Id.
231 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 717-18. Justice Stevens stated:
Before confronting the question whether the Colorado statute
reflects an acceptable balance between the constitutionally protected
rights of law-abiding speakers and the interests of unwilling listeners,
it is appropriate to examine the competing interests at stake. A brief
review of both sides of the dispute reveals that each has legitimate and
important concerns.
Id. at 714. Justice Stevens added: 'The dissenters, however, appear to consider recognizing
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It is apparent from these cases that the Supreme Court routinely evaluates the
seriousness of the harm that would result from unrestricted speech. However, the
Court must not only assess the degree of harm that speech may cause, but it must
also estimate the likelihood that the harm will occur. This aspect of the constitu-
tional calculus is discussed in the following section.
C. The Causal Link Between the Speech and the Harm
Professor Steven Heyman correctly observes that "for the most part, modem
First Amendment doctrine allows regulation only where there is a close relationship
between speech and injury." '232 The importance of this principle may be illustrated
by contrasting two cases reviewing laws that regulate child pornography. Child
pornography consists of images of minors engaging in sexual conduct,23 3 and the
purpose of laws that restrict these images is to deter acts of child sexual abuse.23 4
The central issue in the cases decided by the Supreme Court was whether the laws
under review were likely to achieve this purpose.
In 1982, in the case of New York v. Ferber, the Court considered the constitu-
tionality of a state law that prohibited the production, distribution, and procurement
of materials that depict actual children engaging in sexual performances.2 3 The
Court voted unanimously to uphold the law. The majority of the Court cited among
its reasons for prohibiting actual child pornography: (1) "the use of children as
subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiological, emotional, and
mental health of the child; 23 6 (2) "the materials produced are a permanent record
of the children's participation and the harm to the child is exacerbated by their
circulation; ' 237 and (3) "the distribution network for child pornography must be
closed if the production of material which requires the sexual exploitation of
children is to be effectively controlled. 238
However, in 2002, a majority of the Supreme Court voted to strike down the
any of the interests of unwilling listeners - let alone balancing those interests against the
rights of speakers - to be unconstitutional. Our cases do not support this view." Id. at 718.
232 Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy, supra note 26, at 675.
233 See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 239 (2002) (describing a statute
as prohibiting "sexually explicit images that appear to depict minors"); Ferber, 458 U.S. at
749 (describing statutes as prohibiting distribution of materials depicting sexual performances
by children).
234 See infra notes 242-45 and accompanying text.
235 See generally Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (upholding a state law forbidding any
person to produce, promote, direct, exhibit, or sell any material depicting a sexual perfor-
mance by a child under the age of sixteen).
236 Id. at 758.
131 Id. at 759.
238 Id.
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child pornography law that was reviewed in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition.239
This case concerned the constitutionality of the federal Child Pornography Pre-
vention Act of 1996 (CPPA) that outlawed the production, distribution, and
possession of any material that "appears to be" of a minor engaging in sexually
explicit conduct. 240 The CPPA purported to extend the reach of child pornography
laws to movies and pictures in which youthful adult actors and actresses portray
children engaging in sexual behavior, and to computer generated images that are
"virtually indistinguishable" from depictions of sexual acts by actual children.24 1
The purpose of the CPPA was the same as the law that was reviewed in Ferber -
to deter or prevent the sexual abuse of children.242 However, in contrast to Ferber,
the Court in Free Speech Coalition held that the law would do little or nothing to
prevent child sexual abuse. In Ferber, children were sexually abused when the
materials were produced, sold, and exhibited.243 In Free Speech Coalition, the Court
noted that images of apparent child pornography "do not involve, let alone harm,
any children in the production process."' 4
The government asserted that apparent child pornography leads to child abuse
because the images might stimulate potential child abusers to act upon their
impulses. 24' The Supreme Court rejected this argument on the ground of causation.
239 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
240 See id. at 241 (quoting and summarizing 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B)).
241 See id. at 239-40 ("The statute prohibits, in specific circumstances, possessing or
distributing these images, which may be created by using adults who look like minors or
by using computer imaging."); id. at 249 ('The Government seeks to address this
deficiency[, the fact that some classical and contemporary works appear to depict sexual
conduct by children,] by arguing that speech prohibited by the CPPA is virtually
indistinguishable from child pornography, which may be banned without regard to whether
it depicts works of value.").
242 See id. at 244 (noting that "sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act
repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people").
243 See supra notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
244 See Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 241.
245 Id. at 253-54. The government made other arguments as well to support the constitu-
tionality of the CPPA. It argued that pedophiles might use apparent child pornography to
seduce children. Id. at 251. The Court rejected this argument on the ground that many lawful
items such as candy or video games might serve the same purpose, and that in any event the
government could enact a more narrowly tailored law prohibiting persons from distributing
harmful materials to children. See id. at 251-53. The government also claimed that apparent
child pornography should be banned because persons accused of purveying images of actual
child pornography might defend themselves by claiming that the images were produced with
mature actors or with computer technology. See id. at 254-55. The Court responded by
noting that it would be anomalous to outlaw protected speech on the ground that it resembled
unprotected speech. See id. In an opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Thomas noted
that "the Government points to no case in which a defendant has been acquitted based on a
'computer-generated images' defense." Id. at 259 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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The Court invoked the rule that "[tihe mere tendency of speech to encourage
unlawful acts is not a sufficient reason for banning it,' '21 noting that advocacy of
violenceis punishable only where the unlawfulness is both "imminent" and "likely. N7
The Court found that unlike Ferber, where the child abuse was "intrinsically
related" to the production of the images, the "causal link" between apparent child
pornography and child abuse was "contingent and indirect., 24 Justice Kennedy
stated, "[tihe harm does not necessarily follow from the speech, but depends upon
some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal acts. ' 24 9 He added, "[t]he
Government has shown no more than a remote connection between speech that
might encourage thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse. Without a
significantly stronger, more direct connection, the Government may not prohibit
speech on the ground that it may encourage pedophiles to engage in illegal
conduct."
2 0
The government also argued that apparent child pornography whets the appetite
of the public for actual child pornography, and therefore stimulates the production
of works exploiting actual children.21' The Court found this hypothesis "somewhat
implausible," concluding instead that permitting the distribution of apparent child
pornography would probably have the effect of driving actual child pornography
from the market.
252
Causation is also a crucial, critical element in commercial speech analysis. The
246 Id. at 253.
247 Id. ("The government may suppress speech for advocating the use of force or a vio-
lation of law only if 'such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such action."') (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444,447 (1969)).
248 See id. at 250 ("Virtual child pornography is not 'intrinsically related' to the sexual
abuse of children, as were the materials in Ferber. While the Government asserts that the
images can lead to actual instances of child abuse, the causal link is contingent and
indirect.") (citation omitted). Justice O'Connor agreed with the decision of the majority
regarding the weakness of the causal relationship between the speech and the harm. She
stated: "The Court correctly concludes that the causal connection between pornographic
images that 'appear' to include minors and actual child abuse is not strong enough to justify
withdrawing First Amendment protection for such speech." Id. at 262 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
249 Id. at 250.
250 Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 253-54.
251 See id. at 254 ("In this way, it is said, virtual images promote the trafficking in works
produced through the exploitation of real children.").
252 See id. ("If virtual images were identical to illegal child pornography, the illegal
images would be driven from the market by the indistinguishable substitutes. Few
pornographers would risk prosecution by abusing real children if fictional, computerized
images would suffice."). Justice Kennedy also noted that the Court in Ferber had considered
virtual images to be a permissible alternative to actual child pornography. See id. at 251
(quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982)).
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third prong of the Central Hudson test is that the law must "directly advance" the
governmental objective.2 53 As Justice Anthony Kennedy stated in Edenfield v.
Fane:254 "This burden is not satisfied by mere speculation or conjecture; rather, a
governmental body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must
demonstrate that the harms it recites are real and that its restriction will in fact
alleviate them to a material degree."2 5
Professor Michael Hoefges has carefully traced the evolution of the "directly
advance" prong in commercial speech cases, noting that the Supreme Court has
swung back and forth on the question of how much proof of causation the govern-
ment must adduce in support of a regulation of commercial speech.256 Professor
Paul Horwitz criticizes the Court for requiring substantial proof that advertising
increases consumption of harmful products such as alcohol, tobacco, and gambling,
and suggests that the Supreme Court has failed to assess adequately the dangers of
commercial advertising because it is wedded to a rational model of decision making
that fails to take account of the "judgment-distorting effects of advertising."2 7 He
253 See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564
(1980) ("[TIhe restriction must directly advance the state interest involved.").
254 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993) (striking down a state regulation prohibiting CPAs from
engaging in "direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation") (quoting Fla. Admin. Code §
21A-24.002(2)(c) (1992)).
25 Id. at 770-71.
256 See Michael Hoefges, Protecting Tobacco Advertising Under the Commercial Speech
Doctrine: The Constitutional Impact of Lorillard Tobacco Co., 8 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 267,
276-80 (2003) (describing the application of the "direct-advancement" prong of Central
Hudson in cases leading up to Lorillard Tobacco). Professor Hoefges questions the quality
and sufficiency of the evidence presented by the government in commercial speech cases,
stating:
Under the third Central Hudson factor, which requires the govern-
ment to demonstrate that its regulation directly advances a substantial
regulatory goal in a direct and material way, it is increasingly clear that
the government needs to submit a sufficient evidentiary record in
support of its case. The Supreme Court considered the extent of the
evidentiary record under this factor in Coors Brewing, 44 Liquormart
and Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, and did so again in Lorillard
Tobacco. The Court abandoned in those cases the more deferential
approach taken in Posadas and Edge Broadcasting, in which the Court
had accepted the government's claims of direct advancement with little
or no evidence. Even so, the Court's approach in all of these cases is
mitigated by the rather loose evidentiary standard it has taken when
determining the sufficiency of government evidence supporting claims
of direct advancement under the third factor.
Id. at 306.
257 See Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis, supra note 90, at 56. Professor Horwitz
states:
Since Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court's
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notes that because of the inability of the Court to evaluate the effects of advertising,
"it may be entirely appropriate to leave the issue to legislators and regulators.
" 255
Causation was the decisive element in the Turner Broadcasting cases,259 where
the central issue was whether the "must carry" provisions were likely to achieve the
statutory goal of preserving local broadcast television stations in the face of
competition from cable television.' 6 It was also decisive in the Renton line of
speech-protective approach to commercial speech has been founded on
the theory that consumers are capable of rational choices about product
purchases. Thus, informed consumer choices require "the free flow of
commercial information." As Hanson and Kysar note, however, "it is
naive to presume that consumers can rationally process all the infor-
mation necessary to optimize their purchases." Manufacturers are well
aware of the means that are most effective in affecting people's ability
to make meaningful "informed consumer choices," and do their best to
manipulate these choices through a host of judgment-distorting,
preference-framing techniques.
Id. (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Consumer Citizens Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 763-65 (1976), and Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism
Seriously: Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARv. L. REv. 1420, 1454 (1999)).
Professor Horwitz gives this description of "judgment-distorting" effects of advertising:
Consumers who read or watch commercial speech are subject to
pervasive cognitive illusions. Indeed, as this section shows, over the
same period of time in which the Court moved toward a more speech-
permissive view of commercial speech, propelled by the view that
consumers are capable of rationally analyzing advertising and other
such speech, the advertising industry has taken advantage of its own
store of psychological research into marketing and advertising to
ensure that consumers will be deprived of the fullest use of their
powers of ratiocination. Moreover, some high-risk products, such as
tobacco, are highly addictive and thus still less likely to permit
"rational" consumer choice. Nor are informational strategies designed
to counter the effects of commercial speech an adequate response.
While current behavioral treatments of commercial speech have
focused on how tort liability might be altered to respond to the
preference-distorting effects of commercial speech involving such
products, this section suggests that behavioral analysis counsels a more
speech-restrictive approach than the one toward which the Court is
moving.
Id. at 49-50.
258 Id. at61.
9 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180,224-25 (1997) (uphold-
ing "must carry" provisions); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622-62
(1994) (declaring "must carry" provisions of the federal Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992 to be content neutral).
'60 See Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 667-68 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (remanding the case
to lower courts to determine whether local broadcasting was in danger from cable television
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cases,2 6 1 where the Court increasingly split over the question of whether laws
regulating adult businesses are likely to achieve their goal of suppressing "secondary
effects" such as crime, prostitution, and drug use. These cases are discussed in Part
IV of this article, which examines the nature and reliability of the evidence that the
Court requires to justify laws restricting expression.
The final factor on the right-hand side of the constitutional calculus is whether
the speaker intended to cause harm.
D. The Speaker's Intent to Cause the Harm
The criminal law requires proof of mens rea in order to distinguish innocent
from blameworthy conduct.2 62 Scienter is particularly important in First Amend-
ment cases because of the constitutional presumption that expression is permitted
and therefore constitutes innocent behavior. In the course of explaining why proof
of scienter is a necessary element for offenses related to expression, the Supreme
Court articulated this constitutional presumption in United States v. X-Citement
Video, Inc. :263 "Persons do not harbor settled expectations that the contents of
magazines and film are generally subject to stringent public regulation. In fact, First
Amendment constraints presuppose the opposite view."264 In Ferber, which was
and whether more narrowly tailored means would feasibly address the problem). Justice
Kennedy stated:
Without a more substantial elaboration in the District Court of the
predictive or historical evidence upon which Congress relied, or the
introduction of some additional evidence to establish that the dropped
or repositioned broadcasters would be at serious risk of financial
difficulty, we cannot determine whether the threat to broadcast tele-
vision is real enough to overcome the challenge to the provisions made
by these appellants.
Id. at 667.
261 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425 (2002) (holding that
the city could reasonably rely upon a police department study correlating crime with
concentration of adult businesses); Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (upholding a law
prohibiting public nudity as applied to nude dancing establishment); City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 54-55 (1986) (upholding a municipal ordinance
requiring adult movie theatres to be located more than 1000 feet from any dwelling, church,
park, or school).
262 See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifiy Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CAL.
L. REv. 943, 952 (1999) ("Harmful acts may be done innocently; hence the long tradition of
requiring proof of a culpable state of mind, a mens rea, in order to convict."). See also New
York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) ("[C]riminal responsibility may not be imposed
without some element of scienter on the part of the defendant.").
163 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (interpreting the term "knowingly" in a criminal statute prohibiting
distribution of child pornography to apply to the material's nature and the performer's age).
2 4 Id. at 71 (explaining why laws restricting expression do not qualify as "public welfare"
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also a challenge under the First Amendment, the Court expressly held that "criminal
responsibility may not be imposed without some element of scienter on the part of
the defendant." 26 5. The Supreme Court has held that the government may not obtain
convictions for possession of obscenity and child pornography except upon proof
that the defendant had "knowledge" of the nature and character of the materials.266
The constitutional requirement of scienter in First Amendment prosecutions is so
strong that in X-Citement Video, the Court interpreted the federal child pornography
statute as requiring the defendant to have knowledge that the performers were
underage2 67 despite the absence of express statutory language to support this
interpretation,2 68 and in the face of persuasive legislative history to the contrary, 69
in order to avoid substantial constitutional problems.7
The importance of scienter in First Amendment cases may be traced to Justice
Holmes's famous dissent in Abrams v. United States,"7 ' which is the modem well-
spring of protection for freedom of expression. In Abrams, where the majority of
offenses which are exempt from scienter requirements).
265 Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765.
266 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (stating that knowledge of the material's
character is a necessary element of the offense of possession of obscenity).
267 See X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 73 ("One would reasonably expect to be free from
regulation when trafficking in sexually explicit, though not obscene, materials involving
adults. Therefore, the age of the performers is the crucial element separating legal innocence
from wrongful conduct.").
268 See id. at 68. The statute provided that "[a]ny person who knowingly transports or
ships" or "knowingly receives, or distributes, any visual depiction" that has been shipped or
transported if "the producing of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging
in sexually explicit conduct; and such visual depiction is of such conduct" is guilty of a
felony. Id. The Court cited its "reluctance to simply follow the most grammatical reading of
the statute" Id. at 70.
269 See id. at 73-78 (citing conflicting legislative history). The Justice Department,
commenting upon an early draft of the bill, had stated:
To clarify the situation, the legislative history might reflect that the
defendant's knowledge of the age of the child is not an element of the
offense but that the bill is not intended to apply to innocent transpor-
tation with no knowledge of the nature or character of the material
involved.
Id. at 75 (quoting a Justice Department evaluation of an early form of the bill). The
Conference Committee, in commenting upon a parallel provision of the Act, stated, "it is not
a necessary element of a prosecution that the defendant knew the actual age of the child." Id.
at 76.
270 See id. at 78. The Court stated in its opinion authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist:
"Cases such as Ferber, Smith v. California, Hamling v. United States, and Osborne v. Ohio
suggest that a statute completely bereft of a scienter requirement as to the age of the
performers would raise serious constitutional doubts." Id. (citations omitted).
27' 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (affirming defendants' convictions for violation of the
Espionage Act).
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the Court affirmed the defendants' convictions for violating the Espionage Act
because of inflammatory pamphlets that the defendants distributed, Justice Holmes
dissented on the ground that the defendants did not "intend" to impede the war effort
within the meaning of the Act.272 He emphasized that the statutory element of
"intent" was not satisfied, stating: "It seems to me that no such intent is proved., 27 3
First, he defined "intent" as specific intent: "a deed is not done with intent to produce
a consequence unless that consequence is the aim of the deed., 274 He then argued:
"It seems to me that this statute must be taken to use its words in a strict and
accurate sense." '275 To explain why the law forbidding expressions that obstruct the
war effort must contain a scienter element, he offered a simple example:
A patriot might think that we were wasting money on aero-
planes, or making more cannon of a certain kind than we
needed, and might advocate curtailment with success, yet even
if it turned out that the curtailment hindered and was thought by
other minds to have been obviously likely to hinder the United
States in the prosecution of the war, no one would hold such
conduct a crime.
7 6
According to Justice Holmes, proof of intent to obstruct the war effort was a
necessary element of the offense because it was indispensable for distinguishing
protected political speech from unprotected incitement.277
In 2003, the Supreme Court returned to the question of "intent" in First
Amendment challenges in Virginia v. Black,278 which concerned the constitu-
tionality of a Virginia statute making it illegal to burn a cross in a public place or on
the property of another person with the intent of intimidating another person.279
However, the statute also provided, "[any such burning of a cross shall be prima
facie evidence of an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons."28 Eight
Justices found the "prima facie evidence" provision to be unconstitutional because
it punished cross burning that was purely political as well as cross burning that was
272 See id. at 626-27 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
273 Id. at 626.
274 id. at 627.
275 id.
276 id.
277 250 U.S. at 627-28 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
278 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (upholding a statute criminalizing cross burning with intent to
intimidate, but striking down a provision stating that the act of cross burning constituted
prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate others).
279 See id. at 358-63 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (describing the Virginia statute).
280 Id. at 348 (quoting VA. STAT. ANN. § 18.2-423).
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performed for umrposes of intimidation.2"' Justice O'Connor stated:
The act of burning a cross may mean that a person is engaging
in constitutionally proscribable intimidation. But that same act
may mean only that the person is engaged in core political
speech. The prima facie evidence provision in this statute blurs
the line between these two meanings of a burning cross. As
interpreted by the jury instruction, the provision chills constitu-
tionally protected political speech because of the possibility that
a State will prosecute - and potentially convict - somebody
28! Id. at 367 (striking down the "prima facie evidence" provision as overbroad and
facially unconstitutional). Justice O'Connor stated:
The prima facie evidence provision in this case ignores all of the
contextual factors that are necessary to decide whether a particular
cross burning is intended to intimidate. The First Amendment does not
permit such a shortcut.
For these reasons, the prima facie evidence provision, as inter-
preted through the jury instruction and as applied in Barry Black's
case, is unconstitutional on its face.
Id.; id. at 372-73 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (denying that statute
was facially overbroad, but finding that it was unconstitutionally applied in this case). Justice
Scalia stated:
The plurality is correct in all of this - and it means that some
individuals who engage in protected speech may, because of the prima-
facie-evidence provision, be subject to conviction. Such convictions,
assuming they are unconstitutional, could be challenged on a case-by-
case basis. The plurality, however, with little in the way of explanation,
leaps to the conclusion that the possibility of such convictions justifies
facial invalidation of the statute.
Id.; id. at 386 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (finding the "prima facie
evidence" provision to be not only unconstitutional in itself but rather as evidence that the
entire statute is unconstitutional as viewpoint based law). Justice Souter stated:
Thus, the appropriate way to consider the statute's prima facie
evidence term, in my view, is not as if it were an overbroad statutory
definition amenable to severance or a narrowing construction. The
question here is not the permissible scope of an arguably overbroad
statute, but the claim of a clearly content-based statute to an exception
from the general prohibition of content-based proscriptions, an
exception that is not warranted if the statute's terms show that
suppression of ideas may be afoot. Accordingly, the way to look at the
prima facie evidence provision is to consider it for any indication of
what is afoot. And if we look at the provision for this purpose, it has a
very obvious significance as a mechanism for bringing within the
statute's prohibition some expression that is doubtfully threatening
though certainly distasteful.
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engaging only in lawful political speech at the core of what the
First Amendment is designed to protect.282
The reasoning of the plurality and concurring Justices in Black echoed the
reasoning of Justice Holmes in Abrams and the reasoning of the Court in X-Citement
Video. As Holmes had illustrated with his "aeroplane" example,283 and as the Court
had explained in the child pornography case," to punish speech without the element
of scienter would unconstitutionally sweep innocent expression within the scope of
the statute, rendering the statute unconstitutionally overbroad.8 5
Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality that the principal law forbidding cross
burning with intent to intimidate was constitutional,286 but he disagreed with the
Court's decision to strike down the "prima facie evidence" provision of the law.287
He made two arguments supporting his position that the "prima facie evidence"
provision was constitutional. First, Justice Thomas noted that in statutory rape
cases, there is no requirement that the victim did not consent to engage in sexual
282 See id. at 365 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
283 See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
284 See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
285 See supra notes 264, 266 and accompanying text.
286 See Black, 538 U.S. at 394 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("[T]his statute prohibits only
conduct, not expression."). In response to this argument, the plurality of the Court noted
that expressive conduct is protected under the First Amendment, and that cross burning is
expressive conduct.
Justice Thomas argues in dissent that cross burning is "conduct,
not expression." While it is of course true that burning a cross is
conduct, it is equally true that the First Amendment protects symbolic
conduct as well as pure speech. As Justice Thomas has previously
recognized, a burning cross is a "symbol of hate," and a "a symbol of
white supremacy."
Id. at 360 n. 2 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (quoting Capitol Square Review & Advisory
Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753,770-71 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)) (citation omitted). See
also FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, "SPEECH AcTs" AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 6 (1993) (affirming
that expressive conduct is protected by First Amendment). Professor Haiman states:
Burning a cross on one's own lawn or displaying a swastika at a rally
in a public park is symbolic behavior that qualifies as speech. Burning
a cross on somebody else's lawn, putting a torch to his or her house,
painting a swastika on a group's place of worship or breaking their
windows are acts of physical trespass and defacement or destruction of
property that are legally punishable, regardless of their possible
symbolic purposes or effects.
Id.
287 See Black, 538 U.S. at 395 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("Even assuming that the statute
implicates the First Amendment, in my view, the fact that the statute permits ajury to draw
an inference of intent to intimidate from the cross burning itself presents no constitutional
problems. Therein lies my primary disagreement with the plurality.").
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conduct. 288 He argued that cross burning is so reprehensible that it, too, should be
punished without proof of scienter on the part of the perpetrator.289 Second, he
observed that the abortion protestors who violated the Colorado statute upheld in
Hill v. Colorado could be punished for coming within eight feet of clinic patients
even if their intent was not to intimidate.290 Because "intent to intimidate" was not
an element of the Colorado statute, Justice Thomas reasoned that it need not be an
element of the Virginia cross burning statute. 29' He implied that the Court was
288 For instance, there is no scienter requirement for statutory rape. That
is, a person can be arrested, prosecuted, and convicted for having sex
with a minor, without the government ever producing any evidence, let
alone proving beyond a reasonable doubt, that a minor did not consent.
In fact, "[flor purposes of the child molesting statute ... consent is
irrelevant. The legislature has determined in such cases that children
under the age of sixteen (16) cannot, as a matter of law, consent to have
sexual acts performed upon them, or consent to engage in a sexual act
with someone over the age of sixteen (16)." The legislature finds the
behavior so reprehensible that the intent is satisfied by the mere act
committed by a perpetrator. Considering the horrific effect cross
burning has on its victims, it is also reasonable to presume intent to
intimidate from the act itself.
Id. at 397-98 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In my opinion, in support of his
argument that intent to intimidate is not a necessary element in order to prosecute cross
burning, it would have been more appropriate for Justice Thomas to argue that in statutory
rape cases there is no requirement that the defendant was aware of the fact that the victim
was underage, rather than to focus on the victim's lack of consent to sex.
289 See id. at 397.
290 [Iun Hill v. Colorado the Court upheld a restriction on protests near
abortion clinics, explaining that the State had a legitimate interest,
which was sufficiently narrowly tailored, in protecting those seeking
services of such establishments "from unwanted advice" and
"unwanted communication." In so concluding, the Court placed heavy
reliance on the "vulnerable physical and emotional conditions" of
patients. Thus, when it came to the rights of those seeking abortions,
the Court deemed restrictions on "unwanted advice," which, notably,
can be given only from a distance of at least eight feet from a
prospective patient, justified by the countervailing interest in obtaining
abortion. Yet, here, the plurality strikes down the statute because one
day an individual might wish to bum a cross, but might do so without
an intent to intimidate anyone. That cross burning subjects its targets,
and, sometimes, an unintended audience to extreme emotional distress,
and is virtually never viewed merely as "unwanted communication,"
but rather, as a physical threat, is of no concern to the plurality.
Henceforth, under the plurality's view, physical safety will be valued
less than the right to be free from unwanted communications.
Id. at 399-400 (citations omitted).
291 See id.
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biased in favor of the Ku Klux Klan and against abortion protestors. 2 The plurality
and concurring Justices did not expressly respond to either of these two arguments
put forth by Justice Thomas. In the following, I put forth arguments the majority
might have made to address his points.
Justice Thomas's first argument drawing the analogy to statutory rape laws
proves too much. While it is true that there are a small number of narrowly circum-
scribed laws imposing criminal liability in the absence of mens rea, this is hardly
an argument for extending strict liability to all offenses. Regulatory offenses
(imposing strict liability for offenses such as environmental crimes)," 3 statutory rape
(ignorance as to the age of the victim is no defense)294 and felony murder (requiring
intent to commit the underlying felony but not the killing itself)2" all impose
criminal liability in the absence of scienter as to a key element of the crime.
However, none of these actions are expressive in nature. The rules dispensing with
the requirement of scienter in these cases are exceptions to the general thrust of the
criminal law distinguishing innocent from blameworthy behavior, and, as the Court
explained in X-Citement Video, these exceptions are not applicable to expressive
offenses.296 As the plurality in Black explained, the requirement of specific intent
to intimidate is all that distinguishes protected political expression from unprotected
acts of intimidation. 97
These Justices might have responded to Justice Thomas's second point con-
trasting the result in Black to the result in Hill v. Colorado298 with three separate
arguments. First, they could have distinguished Hill from Black in that the law
keeping abortion protestors at bay in Hill was found to be content neutral,2 9  while
292 See id. at 399 ("What is remarkable is that, under the plurality's analysis, the deter-
mination of whether an interest is sufficiently compelling depends not on the harm a
regulation in question seeks to prevent, but on the area of society at which it aims.").
293 See Kadish, supra note 262, at 954 (discussing strict liability regulatory offenses).
294 See Vicki J. Bejma, Protective Cruelty: State v. Yanez and Strict Liability as to Age
in Statutory Rape, 5 ROGER WIIJAMS U. L. REv. 499, 501 (2000) ("Although mens rea is
central to our legal tradition, since the 19th century most courts have interpreted statutory
rape and child molestation laws as an exception to this rule with respect to the complainant's
age.").
295 See Kadish, supra note 262, at 957-58 (discussing strict liability aspects of felony-
murder rule).
296 See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
297 See supra notes 278-81 and accompanying text.
298 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
299 The Colorado statute's regulation of the location of protests,
education, and counseling is easily distinguishable from Carey. It
places no restrictions on - and clearly does not prohibit - either a
particular viewpoint or any subject matter that may be discussed by a
speaker. Rather, it simply establishes a minor place restriction on an
extremely broad category of communications with unwilling listeners.
Id. at 723.
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the law prohibiting public cross burning in Black was held to be content based, 3°°
and that therefore it was appropriate to require proof of specific intent to cause harm
in Black and not in Hill. Specific intent to cause the resulting harm is not required
under content neutral laws. For example, musical performers who operate their own
sound equipment in a city park without city sound technicians, in violation of a
municipal park's "Use Guidelines," need not be proven to have intended to disturb
nearby residents - intent to commit the act of operating the sound equipment
should be sufficient for conviction."' Similarly, in determining the constitutionality
of a municipal zoning law that dispersed adult businesses,0 2 the Supreme Court
required the government to submit evidence of causation and harm, but not scienter
to support the legislative judgment. Specific intent to cause harm is not a require-
ment for violation of purely content neutral laws.
Second, one could respond to Justice Thomas's argument by conceding that the
Colorado statute at stake in Hill was aimed at political protestors and was therefore
content based,0 3 but that the Colorado statute which prohibited protestors from
approaching within eight feet of patients and staff within 100 feet of a health facility
was a far more limited restriction than the Virginia statute, which prohibited cross
burning in all public places. Accordingly, even if "strict scrutiny" applied to both
" See Black, 538 U.S. at 359 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (Although the First
Amendment erects a presumption against content based laws, certain content based
categories of speech such as fighting words can be proscribed, and stating, "the First Amend-
ment also permits a State to ban a 'true threat."').
30 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,787 n. 2 (1989). The Use Guidelines
state, in pertinent part:
To provide the best sound for all events Department of Parks and
Recreation has leased a sound amplification system designed for the
specific demands of the Central Park Bandshell. To insure appropriate
sound quality balanced with respect for nearby residential neighbors
and the mayorally decreed quiet zone of Sheep Meadow, all sponsors
may use only the Department of Parks and Recreation sound system.
DEPARTMENT OF PARKS AND RECREATION IS TO BE THE
SOLE AND ONLY PROVIDER OF SOUND AMPLIFICATION,
INCLUDING THOUGH NOT LIMITED TO AMPLIFIERS,
SPEAKERS, MONITORS, MICROPHONES, AND PROCESSORS.
Id.
302 See City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425,429 (2002) (O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion) (quoting a municipal ordinance that prohibits "the establishment or
maintenance of more than one adult entertainment business in the same building, structure
or portion thereof").
303 See, e.g., Stephan E. Oestreicher, Jr., Effectual Interpretation and the Content-Neutral
Inquiry: On Justice Scalia and Hill v. Colorado, 12 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 1, 3
(arguing "for adoption of a holistic interpretive framework under which federal courts would
attempt to discern, by any means available, what the effects of a particular statutory speech
restriction are or will be").
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laws, the Colorado statute was more likely to be considered constitutional because
it was "less restrictive" than the Virginia statute.
Third, one could agree with Justice Thomas that the Colorado statute was
intended to silence abortion protestors, and that the law was therefore viewpoint
based and should have been declared unconstitutional. 3°4 If that were the case,
Justice Thomas's argument would prove that Hill was wrongly decided, but it would
also indicate that, by extension, the Virginia statute forbidding cross burning was
also viewpoint based, and therefore unconstitutional with or without the scienter
requirement.
The plurality in Black upheld the cross burning law as being a subset of "true
threats," which is a category of unprotected speech.3"5 The Court held that under
R.A. V., the cross burning law constitutes permissible content discrimination within
an unprotected category of speech.3" If Justice Thomas's reasoning had been
adopted by the Court, and if proof of intent to intimidate were unnecessary for
conviction, then cross burning would necessarily constitute a separate category of
unprotected speech. Yet cross burning, by itself, is not analogous to unprotected
categories of speech such as misleading advertisements, defamation, obscenity, and
child pornography, all of which have little or no constitutional value. In addition to
its use for intimidation, cross burning may also be an act of political expression
which is entitled to the highest protection under the First Amendment." 7 All that
distinguishes protected acts of political expression from unprotected acts of
intimidation is the intent of the speaker. The cross burning law is a content based
law that requires proof of specific intent to intimidate so as to prevent it from being
overbroad.3 °8
One of the great innovations of the Model Penal Code was the delineation of
304 See Hill, 530 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's
dissenting opinion accusing the majority of the Court of bias against abortion protestors.).
Justice Scalia stated:
What is before us, after all, is a speech regulation directed against the
opponents of abortion, and it therefore enjoys the benefit of the "ad hoc
nullification machine" that the Court has set in motion to push aside
whatever doctrines of constitutional law stand in the way of that highly
favored practice.
Id. See also Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of
an Increasingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 McGEORGE L. REV. 69, 100 (1997) (In Madsen and
Schenck, "the impact of the law in question was not only content-based, singling out speech
on abortion, but also viewpoint based, restricting speech of anti-abortion activists.").
305 See Black, 538 U.S. at 359-60.
6 See id. at 361-63.
307 See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
308 See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
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four categories of mens rea: intent, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.", For
example, following a notorious case in which a stalker's conviction was reversed for
failure to prove "intent" to intimidate,31 ° the Minnesota legislature immediately
responded.3t ' The legislature lowered the level of scienter to "negligence,"
amending the statute to criminalize expression or conduct which "the actor knows
or has reason to know [that the intentional conduct] would cause the victim under
the circumstances to feel frightened, threatened, oppressed, persecuted or intimi-
dated." '312 In contrast, the courts have generally refused to lower the scienter
requirement from intent to negligence in suits claiming "imitative harm," that is, in
cases where individuals have imitated crimes depicted in movies or television
shows.313 As one author observes:
The First Amendment should not permit a plaintiff to re-
cover civil damages from a speaker when imitative harm occurs,
unless Brandenburg's culpability requirement has been satisfied.
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. permits a lower culpability require-
ment in the case of libels against private parties, but applying the
same low constitutional culpability standard to harm caused by
mimicry would pose a great threat that majorities would be able
to silence unpopular opinions." 4
... See Kadish, supra note 262, at 952. Professor Kadish states:
The Code's mens rea proposals dissipated these clouds of con-
fusion with an astute and perspicuous analysis that has been adopted in
many states and has infused thinking about mens rea everywhere. We
have been taught to eschew the traditional epithetical and moralistic
jurisprudence of mens rea. Instead, we now inquire whether the crime
requires that the defendant have acted purposely, knowingly, reck-
lessly, or negligently in doing the action prohibited.
Id. (citations omitted).
30 See State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70 (Minn. 1996) (holding that a statute requires proof
of specific intent to intimidate); Demetra M. Pappas, When a Stalker's Hot Pursuit Turns
Coldly Calculated Chase in Minnesota: How Specific Need Expressions of Intent Be or Do
Actions Speak Louder Than Words?, 20 HAMLINE L. REv. 371 (1996) (describing Orsello
and its legislative response).
3' See id. at 372 ("[T]he case of State v. Orsello prompted the immediate formation of
a legislative subcommittee, and, upon the reconvening of the Minnesota state legislature in
January 1997, Minnesota's anti-stalking law was immediately rewritten.") (citations omitted).
312 Id. at 393.
313 See Laura W. Brill, Note, The First Amendment and the Power of Suggestion:
Protecting "Negligent" Speakers in Cases of Imitative Harn, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 984, 987
(1994) ("Most courts deciding the First Amendment issue in such mimicry cases.., have
applied Brandenburg v. Ohio's rigorous incitement standard and have barred recovery.")
(citation omitted).
114 Id. at 1044 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 13:125
SCIENTER, CAUSATION, AND HARM
Accordingly, the level of scienter is an important element in analyzing the constitu-
tionality of a law regulating speech.
In summary, proof of harm, which constitutes the right-hand side of the
constitutional calculus, is comprised of several elements. In order to punish ex-
pression, the government must prove the nature of the harm that it is seeking to
prevent; that the severity of the harm outweighs the value of the expression; that the
expression, if permitted, would likely cause the harm; and, in certain cases, it must
prove that the speaker intended to cause specific harm.
The following portion of this article explains how the Court adjusts the elements
of the harm analysis in relation to the value of the expression being suppressed.
Ill. CALIBRATING SCIENTER, CAUSATION, AND DEGREE OF HARM TO EXPRESSWE
VALUE - THE EXAMPLE OF DEFAMATION
The level of harm necessary to justify a regulation of expression varies in
proportion to the value of the ideas or mode of expression that is being suppressed.
In effect, constitutional doctrine measures the constitutionality of laws restricting
expression by means of a "sliding scale" of harm. This principle explains why, for
example, sexually explicit materials that have serious scientific, artistic, or literary
value may not be suppressed," 5 and why political speech is protected unless the
resulting danger is serious, likely, and immediate.
3 16
Defamation presents an excellent opportunity to explain the "constitutional
calculus" for a number of reasons. First, the Supreme Court has devoted consider-
able attention to this topic, given the desirability of "uninhibited, robust, and wide
open" debate on social issues 3 17 and the need for determinate rules of liability.
318
"' See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (Chief Justice Burger wrote for the
majority that obscene materials are those "which, taken as a whole, do not have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.").
-"6 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (Political advocacy
may not be punished "except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.").
31 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964). See also Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) ("[W]e have been especially anxious to assure to the
freedoms of speech and press that 'breathing space' essential to their fruitful exercise. To that
end this Court has extended a measure of strategic protection to defamatory falsehood.")
(citation omitted).
38 But see Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749,774 (1985)
(White, J., concurring). Justice White argued that the constitutional protection afforded by
Sullivan and Gertz would not financially protect the media:
Nor am I sure that [the rule in Gertz] has saved the press a great deal
of money. Like the New York Times decision, the burden that plaintiffs
must meet invites long and complicated discovery involving detailed
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Second, the Court has applied the constitutional doctrine of defamation in a variety
of factual settings, making it possible to draw broad conclusions about the
architecture of the doctrine. Third, the structure of the law of defamation may be
presented along a spectrum, nicely illustrating matters of degree.
Speech about public officials and matters of public concern constitutes political
speech, and accordingly it is of higher value to society than speech about private
figures or matters of private concern. As a result, the plaintiffs burden of proof is
correspondingly greater in cases involving the defamation of public officials
regarding matters of public concern. In the foundation case New York Times v.
Sullivan,1 9 the Supreme Court identified the "central meaning of the First Amend-
ment"32 to be protection of the right of citizens to engage in "criticism of
government and public officials."32 ' Accordingly, in Sullivan the Court ruled that
where a public official sues for defamation regarding a matter of public concern, the
Constitution imposes a number of requirements upon the plaintiff. The public
official must prove that the defendant made a false statement of fact,3 22 that the false
investigation of the workings of the press, how a news story is
developed, and the state of mind of the reporter and publisher. That
kind of litigation is very expensive. I suspect that the press would be
no worse off financially if the common-law rules were to apply and if
the judiciary was careful to insist that damages awards be kept within
bounds.
Id. (citation omitted).
"9 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964) (overturning a judgment against a newspaper for defamation
on constitutional grounds).
320 Id. at 273. Justice Brennan stated for the majority:
If neither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove
the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct, the combi-
nation of the two elements is no less inadequate. This is the lesson to
be drawn from the great controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798,
which first crystallized a national awareness of the central meaning of
the First Amendment.
Id. (citation omitted).
321 Id. at 276 ("These views reflect a broad consensus that the [Sedition] Act, because of
the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was inconsistent
with the First Amendment.").
32 Id. at 278-79. The Court struck down the rule under state law placing the burden upon
the defendant to prove that the statements were true, stating:
The state rule of law is not saved by its allowance of the defense
of truth.... Under such a rule, would-be critics of official conduct may
be deterred from voicing their criticism, even though it is believed to
be true and even though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it
can be proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do so. They
tend to make only statements which "steer far wider of the unlawful
zone." The rule thus dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public
debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
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statement was "of and concerning" the public official,323 and that the defendant
either knew that the statement was false or acted with reckless disregard as to the
truth.324 In Sullivan, the Court also found that the plaintiff had failed to prove
"actual malice" with "convincing clarity," '325 a requirement the Court later inter-
preted to mean that public officials or public figures must prove their case by "clear
and convincing evidence. 326
The elements of a claim brought by a non-public figure for defamation growing
out of a matter of public concern are somewhat lower. Under Gertz,327 the plaintiff
need not prove that the defendant acted knowingly or recklessly with regard to the
truth; instead, negligence was held sufficient for liability.3 2' The plaintiff may
recover actual damages (if proven) and punitive damages upon a showing of actual
malice,329 and the plaintiff may meet its burden by proving its case by a
Id. (citation omitted).
323 id. at 288 ("We also think the evidence was constitutionally defective in another
respect: it was incapable of supporting the jury's finding that the allegedly libelous
statements were made 'of and concerning' respondent."). The Court explained that allowing
a public official to sue for general criticism of official conduct would have the effect of
"transmuting criticism of government, however impersonal it may seem on its face, into
personal criticism, and hence potential libel, of the officials of whom the government is
composed." Id. at 292.
324 Id. at 287-88 ("We think the evidence against the Times supports at most a finding of
negligence in failing to discover the misstatements, and is constitutionally insufficient to
show the recklessness that is required for a finding of actual malice.").
325 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 285-86 ("Applying these standards, we consider that the proof
presented to show actual malice lacks the convincing clarity which the constitutional
standard demands, and hence that it would not constitutionally sustain the judgment for
respondent under the proper rule of law.").
326 See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485,511 n.30 (1984) ("The
burden of proving 'actual malice' requires the plaintiff to demonstrate with clear and
convincing evidence that the defendant realized that his statement was false or that he
subjectively entertained serious doubt as to the truth of his statement."). See also BE & K
Construction Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002) ("An example of such 'breathing
space' protection is the requirement that a public official seeking compensatory damages for
defamation prove by clear and convincing evidence that false statements were made with
knowledge or reckless disregard of their falsity.").
327 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (establishing constitutional parameters for a suit claiming
defamation of a private individual relating to a matter of public concern).
328 See id. at 347 ("We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the
States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual.").
329 See id. at 348-49.
[W]e endorse this approach in recognition of the strong and legitimate
state interest in compensating private individuals for injury to
reputation. But this countervailing state interest extends no further than
compensation for actual injury. For the reasons stated below, we hold
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preponderance of the evidence. 330
According to the plurality opinion in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.,33 in cases where
a private figure sues for defamation regarding a matter of private concern, the
plaintiff s burden of proof is even lower because such speech is of lower constitu-
tional value. 3 2 The Court held that damages may be presumed3 3 and did not specify
that the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive
damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.
Id. Justice Powell also stated:
We also find no justification for allowing awards of punitive
damages against publishers and broadcasters held liable under state-
defined standards of liability for defamation. In most jurisdictions jury
discretion over the amounts awarded is limited only by the gentle rule
that they not be excessive. Consequently, juries assess punitive dam-
ages in wholly unpredictable amounts bearing no necessary relation to
the actual harm caused. And they remain free to use their discretion
selectively to punish expressions of unpopular views. Like the doctrine
of presumed damages, jury discretion to award punitive damages
unnecessarily exacerbates the danger of media self-censorship, but,
unlike the former rule, punitive damages are wholly irrelevant to the
state interest thatjustifies a negligence standard for private defamation
actions. They are not compensation for injury. Instead, they are private
fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct and to deter
its future occurrence. In short, the private defamation plaintiff who
establishes liability under a less demanding standard than that stated by
New York Times may recover only such damages as are sufficient to
compensate him for actual injury.
Id. at 350.
330 See id. at 366 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Moreover, in contrast to proof by clear and
convincing evidence required under the New York Times test, the burden of proof for reason-
able care will doubtless be the preponderance of the evidence.").
3 ' 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (ruling that the plaintiff need not prove "actual malice" to recover
presumed and punitive damages where defamatory statements did not relate to a matter of
public concern). The Justice who concurred in the plurality opinion agreed that Gertz was
not applicable in a case merely involving matters of private concern. See id. at 764 (Burger,
C.J., concurring) ("I agree that Gertz is limited to circumstances in which the alleged
defamatory expression concerns a matter of general public importance, and that the expres-
sion in question here relates to a matter of essentially private concern."); id. at 774 (White,
J., concurring) ("[Als Justice Powell indicates, the defamatory publication in this case does
not deal with a matter of public importance. Consequently, I concur in the Court's
judgment."). Furthermore, since the concurring justices would have overruled Gertz and
Sullivan, id. at 763-65 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 765-74 (White, J., concurring), the
views of the plurality represent the narrowest articulated grounds supporting the decision of
the Court, and therefore are entitled to precedential force under the rule of Marks v. United
States, 430 U.S. 188, 192-94 (1977) (In the case of a split majority, the narrowest reasoning
of the Justice supplying the decisive vote should be considered the reasoning of the Court.).
332 Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 758-59 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) ('The First
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any particular level of scienter that needs to be proven.3 "
The following chart illustrates how the plaintiffs burden of proof, the defen-
dant's level of scienter, and the type of damages that may be recovered varies
according to the type of information being suppressed.
PROOF OF HARM FOR CATEGORIES OF DEFAMATION
Category of Plaintiff's Bur- Defendant's Recoverable
Defamation den of Proof Level of Scienter Damages
Defamation of Clear and Recklessness or Actual
Public Figure Convincing Knowledge of Damages
Regarding Matters Evidence Falsity
of Public Concern
Defamation of Preponderance Negligence Actual
Private Figure of the Evidence Damages
Regarding Matters
of Public Concern
Defamation of Preponderance No Fault Presumed and
Private Figure of the Evidence Actual
Regarding Matters Damages
of Private Concern
In summary, the constitutional calculus balancing value against harm is boldly
illustrated by the law of defamation. The greater the value of the speech being
suppressed, the more proof of harm must be presented to justify the suppression of
that speech.
Amendment interest, on the other hand, is less important than the one weighed in Gertz. We
have long recognized that not all speech is of equal First Amendment importance. It is
speech on 'matters of public concern' that is 'at the heart of the First Amendment's
protection."') (citation omitted).
333 In Gertz, we found that the state interest in awarding presumed and
punitive damages was not "substantial" in view of their effect on
speech at the core of First Amendment concern. This interest, however,
is "substantial" relative to the incidental effect these remedies may
have on speech of significantly less constitutional interest.
Id. at 760 (citation omitted).
314 Id. at 761 ("In light of the reduced constitutional value of speech involving no matters
of public concern, we hold that the state interest adequately supports awards of presumed and
punitive damages - even absent a showing of 'actual malice."') (citation omitted).
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IV. THE EMERGING EMPIRICAL TREND IN PROVING HARM
Over the last decade there has emerged a simple and striking trend in the
reasoning of the Supreme Court regarding freedom of expression. Instead of
focusing on the right to freedom of expression, the Court is increasingly turning its
attention to an analysis of the harm that may result from allowing the speech to
remain unregulated. In place of analyzing what the law is, the Court is attempting
to determine the facts that would justify regulation of speech. Rather than
conducting a legal analysis, the Court is engaging in an empirical inquiry.35
This trend is consistent with the pragmatic legal philosophy of Judge Richard
Posner, which is essentially a commitment to consequentialist analysis.336 Posner
argues that "[m]ost Americans, including most American judges, are pragmatists
rather than ideologues, but to come up with pragmatic solutions they have to
understand the empirical dimensions of the legal disputes that come before them for
resolution." '337 In particular, Judge Posner favors a pragmatic approach to solving
335 See Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality, supra note 4, at 851 (briefly discussing how
the Supreme Court is "replacing categories with evidence" in First Amendment analysis).
336 See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism in FirstAmendment Analysis,
54 STAN. L. REv. 737, 738 (2002) [hereinafter Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism].
Posner describes "pragmatism" as being concerned not with "truth" but with the conse-
quences of a decision:
Pragmatism is a complex philosophical movement the core of which is
a challenge to the preoccupation of the central philosophical tradition
of the West, from Plato to Kant and Russell and Carnap, with
establishing the foundations of knowledge - the conditions under
which scientific, moral, and political beliefs can be said to be true.
Pragmatists believe that the task of establishing such foundations and
so validating our beliefs as objective is either impossible or un-
interesting, and in either case not worth doing. The test for knowledge
should not be whether it puts us in touch with an ultimate reality
(whether scientific, aesthetic, moral, or political) but whether it is
useful in helping us to achieve our ends. The human mind developed
not to build a pipeline to the truth but to cope with the physical
environment in which human beings evolved, and so a proposition
should be tested not by its correspondence with "reality" but by the
consequences of believing or disbelieving it.
Id. See also Stephen E. Gottlieb, Tears for Tiers on the Rehnquist Court, 4 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 350, 362 (2002) (Professor Gottlieb argues for consequentialist approach in equal
protection cases: "All levels of scrutiny imply a balance between the harm caused by the
violation of some protected right or interest and the social purposes pursued over the
damaged body of that right or interest.").
33' Richard A. Posner, Conceptions of Legal "Theory": A Reply to Ronald Dworkin, 29
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 377, 387 (1997).
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First Amendment problems,33 and has called for more empiricism in First Amend-
ment analysis, stating:
Constitutional scholarship, including the scholarship of free
speech, is preoccupied on the one hand with Supreme Court
decisions that are notably lacking in an empirical dimension and
on the other hand with normative theories of free speech that
have no empirical dimension either. Vast as the literature is,
very little of it is concerned with the kind of empirical questions
raised by this paper. This should be a source of concern to any-
one who believes that the instrumental approach to free speech
should have a role to play in the formation of public policy.339
However, complicating the empirical approach is the absence of standards
governing the nature of the evidence and the quantum of proof necessary to sustain
the constitutionality of laws regulating speech. These standards are lacking because
constitutionality is a pure question of law for the court, not a question of fact for the
trier of fact. Accordingly, questions of admissibility of evidence bearing on consti-
tutionality are not governed by the rules of evidence,340 but rather are subject to
judicial notice as matters of "legislative fact." Furthermore, the quantum of proof
338 See generally Posner, Pragmatism Versus Purposivism, supra note 336 (rebutting the
intentionalist approach of Professor Rubenfeld).
13' Richard A. Posner, The Speech Market and the Legacy of Schenck, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 121, 151 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey C.
Stone eds., 2002). See also Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis, supra note 90, at 67
(quoting the cited passage and discussing Posner's views).
340 See FED. R. EviD. 201(a) ('This rule governs only judicial notice of adjudicative
facts."); FED. R. EviD. 20 1(a) advisory committee notes ('This is the only evidence rule on
the subject ofjudicial notice. It deals only with judicial notice of 'adjudicative' facts. No rule
deals with judicial notice of 'legislative facts."').
141 See FED. R. EvD. 201 (a) advisory committee notes (explaining the difference between
"adjudicative facts" and "legislative facts"). The advisory committee notes adopt the
suggestions of Professor Morgan regarding judicial notice of legislative fact:
Professor Morgan gave the following description of the method-
ology of determining domestic law:
In determining the content or applicability of a rule of domes-
tic law, the judge is unrestricted in his investigation and
conclusion. He may reject the propositions of either party or
of both parties. He may consult the sources of pertinent data
to which they refer, or he may refuse to do so. He may make
an independent search for persuasive data or rest content with
what he has or what the parties present.... [T]he parties do
no more than to assist; they control no part of the process.
This is the view which should govern judicial access to legislative
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for inquiries incidental to questions of law is not determined by reference to familiar
standards such as preponderance of the evidence. For example, in City of Erie v.
Pap's A.M., Justice Souter observed: "In several recent cases, we have confronted
the need for factual justifications to satisfy intermediate scrutiny under the First
Amendment. Those cases do not identify with any specificity a particular quantum
of evidence, nor do I seek to do so in this brief concurrence.
' 34 2
Despite the fact that proof of harm is a "question of law" for courts, as standard
doctrine turns from a categorical to a balancing approach in freedom of expression
cases, the courts necessarily assume the responsibility to make a more intensive
investigation of the underlying facts. As Justice Antonin Scalia has observed:
[W]here an appellate judge says that the remaining issue must be
decided on the basis of the totality of the circumstances, or by a
balancing of all the factors involved, he begins to resemble a
finder of fact more than a determiner of law.
3 43
Justice Scalia's observation is borne out when we consider the information that
is needed to determine constitutionality under the pragmatic approach which
balances "expressive value" against "proof of harm." Traditionally, in the field of
constitutional law, legal research consisted of: identifying and reviewing the rele-
vant constitutional text and drawing implications from the text; investigating the
history of the drafting and adoption of the relevant constitutional provisions;
examining the reasoning contained in judicial opinions; considering the preceden-
tial weight that should be accorded to those decisions; and uncovering relevant
facts. It renders inappropriate any limitation in the form of indisput-
ability, any formal requirements of notice other than those already
inherent in affording opportunity to hear and be heard and exchanging
briefs, and any requirement of formal findings at any level. It should,
however leave open the possibility of introducing evidence through
regular channels in appropriate situations.
Id. (quoting Edmund M. Morgan, Judicial Notice, 57 HARV. L. REv. 269, 270-71 (1944)).
342 City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277, at 311 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"' Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1182
(1989). Justice Scalia does not approve of this development. He states:
To reach such a stage is, in a way, a regrettable concession of defeat -
an acknowledgment that we have passed the point where "law,"
properly speaking, has any further application. And to reiterate the
unfortunate practical consequences of reaching such a pass when there
still remains a good deal of judgment to be applied: equality of treat-
ment is difficult to demonstrate and, in a multi-tiered judicial system,
impossible to achieve; predictability is destroyed;judicial arbitrariness
is facilitated; judicial courage is impaired.
[Vol. 13:125
SCIENTER, CAUSATION, AND HARM
constitutional traditions, including the traditional practices of our governmental
entities as well as the customs and customary understanding of the people.' But
the Supreme Court is turning its focus from these traditional building blocks of legal
reasoning toward an overt and realistic balancing of the harms that government is
seeking to prevent. The Court is, as Justice Scalia predicted, becoming a "finder of
fact." It is the culmination of the process that Louis Brandeis initiated in Muller v.
Oregon,345 when he submitted a brief which consisted of two pages of legal argu-
ment supplemented by over ninety pages summarizing social studies describing the
effect of long hours and low wages on women workers and their families.3"
In recent freedom of expression cases, the Court is increasingly turning its
attention to the quality and quantity of proof of the causal link between speech and
harm. For example, the sufficiency of the government's evidence of harm was the
fulcrum issue in Turner I7 and Turner II,48 which concerned the constitutionality
of a federal statute requiring cable operators to reserve channels for local broadcast
stations.349 The principal empirical question that faced the Court was whether the
federal government had adduced sufficient evidence that local broadcasting faced
extinction absent governmental intervention.3 0 In Turner I, Justice Stevens con-
cluded that there was enough evidence in the record to support the conclusion that
the "must carry" provisions of federal law were necessary to protect broadcast
'44 See PHip BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 11-30 (1991) (identifying six
constitutional "modalities" of constitutional interpretation); HUHN, FIVE TYPES, supra note
181 (classifying five types of legal arguments, and the standard ways to rebut each type of
argument).
345 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding a state statute establishing maximum work hours for
women).
346 See 16 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 63-178 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper, eds., 1975)
(reproducing the original brief). See also PAUL L. ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL
SCIENCE 75-87 (1972) (describing the brief and discussing its significance).
347 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
341 520 U.S. 180 (1997).
141 See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 185. Justice Kennedy stated:
Sections 4 and 5 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992 require cable television systems to dedicate
some of their channels to local broadcast television stations. Earlier in
this case, we held the so-called "must-carry" provisions to be content-
neutral restrictions on speech, subject to intermediate First Amendment
scrutiny ....
Id.
350 See Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 665 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) ("In defending the
factual necessity for must-carry, the Government relies in principal part on Congress'
legislative finding that, absent mandatory carriage rules, the continued viability of local
broadcast television would be 'seriously jeopardized."').
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television.3 1' However. the pluralitv of the Court led by Justice Kennedy wanted an
expanded record, so it remanded the case to the District Court with instructions to
take more evidence on this issue.35 2 When the case returned to the Supreme Court
in Turner II, the Justices conducted a painstaking review of the legislative and
judicial record.353 The majority concluded that the massive record provided
adequate support for the legislative findings, 354 but the dissenting Justices found that
the legislative and judicial record was inadequate to support the constitutionality of
the "must carry" provisions.35 5 In Turner I, Justice Kennedy repeated the familiar
principle that the government has the burden of presenting evidence in support of
a regulation of speech:
"5 See id. at 673 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) ("While
additional evidence might cast further light on the efficacy and wisdom of the must-carry
provisions, additional evidence is not necessary to resolve the question of their facial
constitutionality.").
352 See Turner 11, 520 U.S. at 185. Justice Kennedy stated:
A plurality of the Court [in Turner I] considered the record as then
developed insufficient to determine whether the provisions were
narrowly tailored to further important governmental interests, and we
remanded the case to the District Court for the District of Columbia for
additional factfinding.
On appeal from the District Court's grant of summary judgment
for appellees, the case now presents the two questions left open during
the first appeal: First, whether the record as it now stands supports
Congress' predictive judgment that the must-carry provisions further
important governmental interests; and second, whether the provisions
do not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further those
interests. We answer both questions in the affirmative, and conclude
the must-carry provisions are consistent with the First Amendment.
Id.
313 See id. at 189-223 (discussing the evidence presented to Congress and the evidence
presented to lower courts). Justice Kennedy observed:
On our earlier review, we were constrained by the state of the
record to assessing the importance of the Government's asserted inter-
ests when "viewed in the abstract." The expanded record now permits
us to consider whether the must-carry provisions were designed to
address a real harm, and whether those provisions will alleviate it in a
material way.
Id. at 195 (citation omitted).
354 We cannot displace Congress' judgment respecting content-neutral
regulations with our own, so long as its policy is grounded on reason-
able factual findings supported by evidence that is substantial for a
legislative determination. Those requirements were met in this case,
and in these circumstances the First Amendment requires nothing
more.
Id. at 224-25.
31s See id. at 240-56 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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When the Government defends a regulation on speech as a
means to redress past harms or prevent anticipated harms, it
must do more than simply "posit the existence of the disease
sought to be cured." It must demonstrate that the recited harms
are real, not merely conjectural, and that the regulation will in
fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way.356
However, Justice Kennedy did not adopt a particularly rigorous standard for
reviewing the evidence adduced by the government. He specifically articulated a
"substantial evidence" standard, which is the standard for reviewing adjudicative
decisions of administrative agencies,357 but he stated that the Court would apply this
standard in a more deferential manner to Congressional findings than it would in
reviewing the findings of an administrative agency.35 He noted that the dissenting
Justices had called for the taking of additional detailed evidence to support the
necessity and efficacy of the "must carry" provisions, 359 but he specifically rejected
their request, observing that it would be "an improper burden for courts to impose
on the Legislative Branch"3' 6 and "as unreasonable in the legislative context as it is
constitutionally unwarranted.
36
'
Similarly, Justice David Souter focused on the problem of establishing a
standard for measuring the quantum of proof that the government must offer to
support legislation restricting speech in his dissenting opinion in Alameda Books,
and concluded that the burden of proof depended in part upon the availability of
356 Turner 1, 512 U.S. at 664 (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion) (citation omitted).
... See Turner II, 520 U.S. at 195 ("In reviewing the constitutionality of a statute, 'courts
must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress.' Our sole
obligation is 'to assure that, in formulating its judgments, Congress has drawn reasonable
inferences based on substantial evidence."') (quoting Turnerl, 512 U.S. at 665-66 (Kennedy,
J., plurality opinion)).
358 See id. See also Horwitz, Free Speech as RiskAnalysis, supra note 90, at 61 (Questions
relating to customer response to advertising ought to be committed to legislators or regula-
tors, stating, "it may be entirely appropriate to leave the issue to legislators and regulators.").
"9 Id. at 212-13. Justice Kennedy stated:
Despite the considerable evidence before Congress and adduced
on remand indicating that the significant numbers of broadcast stations
are at risk, the dissent believes yet more is required before Congress
could act. It demands more information about which of the dropped
broadcast stations still qualify for mandatory carriage; about the broad-
cast markets in which adverse decisions take place; and about the
features of the markets in which bankrupt broadcast stations were
located prior to their demise.
Id. (citations omitted).
360 Id. at 213.
361 id.
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relevant evidence. Justice Souter expressed dissatisfaction with the evidence
adduced by the City of Los Angeles in support of a zoning ordinance dispersing
adult businesses, stating that "requiring empirical justification of claims about
property value or crime is not demanding anything Herculean. 362 Justice Souter
noted that the type and quantum of evidence "varies with the point that has to be
established,"3 63 but that where the evidence is "readily available" the Court "must
be careful about substituting common assumptions for evidence. ' ' 3' He contended
that it would have been feasible for the City of Los Angeles to have produced
evidence supporting the legislative judgment, stating:
Increased crime, like prostitution and muggings, and declining
property values in areas surrounding adult businesses, are all
readily observable, often to the untrained eye and certainly to the
police officer and urban planner. These harms can be shown by
police reports, crime statistics, and studies of market value, all
of which are within a municipality's capacity or available from
the distilled experiences of comparable communities.36
Justice Souter found that "no study conducted by the city has reported that this
type of traditional business, any more than any other adult business, has a
correlation with secondary effects in the absence of concentration with other adult
establishments in the neighborhood." 3" Accordingly, he dissented from the ruling
of the majority that the municipal ordinance should survive a challenge to its
constitutionality on summary judgment, stating that the "principal reason" for his
dissent was the "evidentiary insufficiency" of the evidence presented by the city. 67
362 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 458 (2002).
363 Id. at 459 (Souter, J., dissenting).
164 Id. at 459.
365 Id. at 45 8-59.
366 Id. at 463-64.
367 Id. at 454. Justice Souter stated;
Thejustification claimed for this application of the new policy remains,
however, the 1977 survey, as supplemented by the authority of one
decided case on regulating adult arcades in another State. The case
authority is not on point, and the 1977 survey provides no support for
the breakup policy. Its evidentiary insufficiency bears emphasis and is
the principal reason that I respectfully dissent from the Court's
judgment today.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Christopher Thomas Leahy, The First Amendment Gone
Awry: City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., Ailing Analytical Structures, and the Suppression of
Protected Expression, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1021, 1058-65 (2002) (critiquing evidence pur-
porting to support the role of nude dancing establishments in causing "secondary effects"
such as crime, prostitution, drug use, and decline in property values).
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The recent trend towards empiricism was followed in McConnell v. Federal
Election Commission,368 where, after a lengthy examination of the evidence linking
"soft money" to political corruption,369 the majority opinion, jointly authored by
Justices O'Connor and Stevens, concludes that "there is substantial evidence to
support Congress' determination that large soft-money contributions to national
political parties give rise to corruption and the appearance of corruption.""37 Profes-
sor Jeffrey Rosen characterizes the Court's opinion in McConnell as "practical" and
"very pragmatic," noting that the majority avoided employing a "rigid rule" to
decide the case.37" '
In summary, First Amendment jurisprudence has developed to the point where
complex factual assessments are necessary for making determinations of constitu-
tionality. These are often matters which are susceptible to resolution only after
receiving and carefully weighing expert opinion testimony from the field of
economics or other social sciences.372 This in turn has given rise to a number of
difficult questions relating to the "admissibility" and "sufficiency" of the evidence
considered by the Court. For example, is expert testimony necessary regarding the
relation between speech and harm, or may the Court draw "common sense"
368 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003) (upholding most provisions of McCain-Feingold against a First
Amendment challenge).
369 See id. at 652-60 (discussing a 1998 report of the Senate Committee on Governmental
Affairs, setting forth extensive evidence of linkage between unregulated contributions and
governmental action); id. at 672-76 (summarizing evidence of the corrupting influence of
large contributions presented to a lower court).
370 See id. at 666 (upholding key provisions of the Act).
311 SeeAll Things Considered (National Public Radio broadcast, Dec. 11, 2003). Referring
to the majority opinion in McConnell, Professor Rosen remarked:
Very pragmatic, indeed. And that's the most interesting thing about this
decision. O'Connor, the former state legislator, was willing to look at
the actual flow of money just as she did in the affirmative action case,
where she understood the strong pressure by universities to keep up the
numbers of minorities and the pressure to lower academic standards.
So here she, instead of imposing a very rigid rule, such as "Money is
speech, or individuals are corporations," was far more practical. And
that was a welcome development, as well.
Id.
372 See Horwitz, Free Speech as Risk Analysis, supra note 90, at 67 (arguing that the
courts should place more reliance upon the social science of "behavioral analysis" in First
Amendment cases). Professor Horwitz states:
As long as instrumental arguments about free speech are in play, then,
it makes sense to add a new player to the game. The law of free speech
is, in the final analysis, about making decisions under uncertainty.
Behavioral analysis helps us understand better how to go about making
those decisions.
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conclusion. regnrding cnse nnd effprt9 373 M,1vt tho mnateal eidence be placed
upon the record created by the trial court, or may the appellate court take judicial
notice of relevant treatises and scientific studies? Should the testimony of experts
and others be subject to the rigors of cross examination? Should Daubert standards
apply in determining what scientific evidence may be considered? Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, are the courts the appropriate entity to draw conclusions
regarding these complex matters, or should the courts defer to legislative or regula-
tory authorities? 7 4 As the Court increasingly turns to empirical data to support
arguments in favor of constitutionality, it will necessarily continue to confront these
difficult questions of interpretative process.
V. CONCLUSION
In the interpretation of the First Amendment, the United States Supreme Court
has not only embraced the vision of Louis Brandeis and Oliver Wendell Holmes as
to the critical importance of the First Amendment in American life and law, but it
has also adopted their pragmatic method of jurisprudence. The law of freedom of
expression is turning away from rigid categorical analysis and toward an open-ended
process of balancing, whereby the Court conducts a careful examination comparing
the expressive value of speech to the harm that would likely result if the speech were
not regulated.
Categorical approaches to constitutional law give the illusion of being a bulwark
against governmental overreaching. However, our freedoms are protected not by
doctrine, but by the value that our society, and ultimately the courts, accord to these
freedoms. In the final analysis, the First Amendment depends upon reasoned
decisions that thoughtfully weigh the precious right to freedom of expression against
the harms caused by speech: decisions that are based upon reliable and substantial
evidence of harm, decisions that place the burden of proof on the government to
prove scienter, and the causal link between speech and harm. With greater intru-
sions upon the freedom of expression, the courts must insist that the government
prove higher levels of scienter, more immediate connections between speech and
... Compare Watchtower v. Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 178 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissent-
ing) (In appealing to "common sense" when evaluating the constitutionality of a law
regulating door-to-door solicitation, Rehnquist stated: "We have approved of permit
requirements for those engaging in protected First Amendment activity because of a common
sense recognition that their existence both deters and helps detect wrongdoing."), with City
of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 459 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting) (In
arguing that the Court should demand empirical data and not simply rely upon "common
sense" in determining the efficacy of zoning laws dispersing adult businesses, Souter stated:
"reviewing courts need to be wary when the government appeals, not to evidence, but to an
uncritical common sense in an effort to justify such a zoning restriction.").
114 See supra notes 340-46 and accompanying text.
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harm, and more serious harms before laws suppressing speech may be upheld.
The law of freedom of expression is framed by two competing principles: the
"harm principle" and the "value principle." The harm principle arises from respect
for individual autonomy, and it requires that before speech may be suppressed, the
government must prove that the speech causes some harm other than mere societal
disapproval of the message. The value principle is drawn from the social purposes
of freedom of expression, which are to foster democracy and advance the search for
political, religious, scientific, and artistic truth, and it presumes that speech that
serves these goals possesses more constitutional value than speech that does not.
The standard that is derived from the interaction of the harm principle and the
value principle is that the greater the value of the expression that is being restricted,
the more proof of harm that the government must adduce in order to justify the
restriction.
Proof of harm consists of four elements: (i) the intent of the speaker, (ii) the
strength of the causal link between speech and the harm, and (iii) the nature and (iv)
degree of the anticipated harm. In recent cases the Court has devoted considerable
attention to these elements. Several decisions have turned upon these factors, and
the Court is beginning to formalize the procedures for determining each factor to
improve the reliability and probativeness of the constitutional evidence before the
Court.
2004]
